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TARGETING ANWAR AL-AULAQI: A CASE STUDY IN
U.S. DRONE STRIKES AND TARGETED KILLING
BENJAMIN R. FARLEY*
2Q6HSWHPEHU+HOOÀUHPLVVLOHVÀUHGIURP&,$RSHUDWHGGURQHVVWUXFNDFDUWUDYHOLQJ
through a remote Yemeni governorate, killing Anwar al-Aulaqi.1 Al-Aulaqi—a Yemeni-American
best known for his jihadist tracts delivered in colloquial American English—was reportedly added
to U.S. targeted killing lists in early 2010 and was the target of at least one earlier U.S. airstrike2 The
killing of al-Aulaqi has focused attention on the U.S. practice of targeted killings. It has also raised
TXHVWLRQVDERXWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·OHJDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQVIRUFRQGXFWLQJWDUJHWHGNLOOLQJVVHOIGHIHQVH
DQGDUPHGFRQÁLFW3 When applicable, each of these frameworks provides legal authority for a state
to use force against an individual.4+RZHYHUQHLWKHUIUDPHZRUNSURYLGHVDEODQNHWMXVWLÀFDWLRQ
for—or a blanket prohibition against—targeted killings. Instead, each framework provides authority
for the use of force, including targeted killings, when that framework’s particular requirements are
VDWLVÀHG
Unlike most scholarship addressing targeted killings, this Article does not argue that targeted
killings are generally lawful or generally unlawful. Instead, this Article argues that, although both
VHOIGHIHQVHDQGDUPHGFRQÁLFWSURYLGHDXWKRULW\IRUDVWDWH·VXVHRI IRUFHZKHQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH
SDUDPHWHUVDUHVDWLVÀHGVHOIGHIHQVHIDLOVWRMXVWLI\WKHFRQWLQXRXVWDUJHWLQJRI $QZDUDO$XODTLDQG
other individuals on U.S. targeted killing list. Nevertheless, this Article argues that al-Aulaqi was
OLNHO\MXVWLÀDEO\WDUJHWDEOHRQDFRQWLQXRXVEDVLVGXHWRKLVGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDQRQJRLQJDUPHG
* J.D., with honors, Emory University School of Law (2011); M.A., The Elliott School of International Affairs, The
George Washington University (2007). The author would like to thank Professors Charles Shanor and Laurie R. Blank
IRUWKHLUFULWLFDOFRPPHQWVUHÁHFWLRQVDQGVXSSRUW7KHDXWKRUDGGLWLRQDOO\WKDQNV-D\%XUKDQ+DLGHUDQG%UHWW(
Sterling.
 0DUN0D]]HWWL(ULF6FKPLWW 5REHUW):RUWKTwo-year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2011, at A1.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law and the Obama Administration, Keynote
Address Before the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010); Mem. in Supp. of Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss at
4-5, 8-9, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010).
4 For a discussion of whether targeted killings should be governed by the law enforcement paradigm or the “war”
paradigm in counterterrorism contexts, see CHARLES A. SHANOR, COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 642–74 (2011); see also
GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, AND TERRORISTS 69–91 (2010).
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FRQÁLFWEHWZHHQDO4DHGDLQWKH$UDELDQ3HQLQVXOD $4$3 DQG<HPHQDFRQÁLFWLQZKLFKWKH
United States is intervening.
To reach these conclusions, this Article analyzes the use of force against Anwar al-Aulaqi under
both frameworks. Part I provides background information on Anwar al-Aulaqi, AQAP, and the
8QLWHG6WDWHV·WDUJHWHGNLOOLQJSURJUDP3DUW,,H[SORUHVVHYHUDOSRWHQWLDODUPHGFRQÁLFWVLQZKLFK
both the United States and al-Aulaqi are participating, which would vest the United States with
authority to kill al-Aulaqi. Finally, Part III analyzes whether the United States is able to rely on selfdefense to justify its targeting of al-Aulaqi.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Anwar al-Aulaqi
Anwar al-Aulaqi was an American-born Islamic cleric.5 Although he emerged as a voice of moderate Islam in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,6 he has since been linked to the 9/11 hijackers,7 as
well as to several recent attempted and consummated terrorist attacks against the United States by
AQAP.8
Although the exact nature of al-Aulaqi’s involvement with AQAP is unclear, he appears to have
HYROYHGIURPDQLQVSLUDWLRQDOWRDQRSHUDWLRQDOOHDGHU$VRI -DQXDU\VHQLRU86RIÀFLDOVVWDWed, “[T]he best way to describe him is inspirational rather than operational.”9 More recently, though,
86RIÀFLDOVKDYHGHVFULEHGKLPDVEHLQJD´UHFUXLWHUµDQGDVEHLQJ´LQYROYHGLQSORWVµ10 He was
reportedly responsible for AQAP’s interest in attacking targets within the United States.11 He was
HYHQGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJPRUHGDQJHURXVWKDQ2VDPDELQ/DGHQ´SUREDEO\WKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWULVN

 -DPHV*RUGRQ0HHN .DWLH1HOVRQCleric Anwar al-Awlaki puts ‘Everybody Draw Mohammed’ Cartoonist Molly Norris on
Execution List, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 11, 2010.
6 Scott Shane, Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009 at A1 (“A month after the Sept. 11
DWWDFNVKHWROGWKH1HZ<RUN7LPHVWKDWKHZRXOGQRORQJHUWROHUDWH¶LQÁDPPDWRU\UKHWRULFµ %REE\*KRVKHow
Dangerous is the Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki?, TIME, Jan. 13, 2010 (“Indeed, [al-Aulaqi] spoke out against radicals, prompting
the New York Times in October 2001 to label him as one of a ‘new generation of Muslim leader capable of merging
East and West.’”).
7 Scott Shane, Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009 at A1 (“[Al Aqlaki’s] contacts with
three of the Sept. 11 hijackers . . . remain a perplexing mystery about the 2001 attacks . . . .”).
8 Chris McGreal, &DUJR7HUURU3ORW:DQWHG0HQ$O4DLGDERPEPDNHUZKR6DFULÀFHGKLV%URWKHU, GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 1,
2010, at A4; Muslim Cleric Aulaqi had Lunch at Pentagon, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2010, at A11.
9 Ghosh, supra note 6.
10 Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Ties to Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2010 at A12; Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA’s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010 (“‘Over the past several years, [al$XODTL@KDVJRQHIURPSURSDJDQGLVWWRUHFUXLWHUWRRSHUDWLRQDOSOD\HU·VDLGD86FRXQWHUWHUURULVPRIÀFLDOµ 
11 See, e.g., LYDIA KHALIL, The Next Base?: Concerns About Somalia and Yemen, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE
5 (2011) (attributing the increase in AQAP attacks targeting the West to al-Aulaqi’s role in the organization); Thomas
Hegghammer, The Case for Chasing al-Awlaki, FOR. POL’Y, Nov. 24, 2010 (“[Al-Aulaqi] is arguably the single most
important individual behind the group’s efforts to carry out operations in the West . . . .”).
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to the U.S. homeland.”12
*RYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVUHSRUWHGO\DGGHGDO$XODTLWRWKH-RLQW6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG·VOLVW
of targets for kill or capture as of January 2010.13 On April 6, 2010, Obama administration leaks
revealed that al-Aulaqi had been placed on the CIA’s separate targeted killing list because he was
“believed to have shifted from encouraging attacks to directly participating in them.”14 In July 2010,
the U.S. Treasury Department formally designated al-Aulaqi a terrorist.15 On May 5, 2011, a U.S. airstrike in Yemen targeted but narrowly missed al-Aulaqi.16 Finally, on September 30, 2011, a battery
RI +HOOÀUHPLVVLOHVODXQFKHGIURP&,$RSHUDWHGGURQHVVWUXFNDO$XODTL·VFDUNLOOLQJKLP17
B. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
In January 2009, al-Qaeda in Yemen and the remnants of an al-Qaeda cell from Saudi Arabia
merged to form AQAP.18 Both of these local cells were formed following the so-called “Yemeni
Great Escape of 2006.” On February 3, 2006, twenty-three inmates escaped from Yemen’s Political
Security Organization (PSO) headquarters in Sana’a by tunneling 460 feet from their basement cell
to a neighboring mosque.19 Two of these escapees emerged as the leaders of al-Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula, or al-Qaeda in Yemen.20
As an organization, AQAP is distinct from al-Qaeda proper.21 An emir, currently Nasir al-Wahayshi, heads the group. AQAP maintains its own propaganda arm, which produces a bimonthly
magazine entitled Salah al-Malahim. It has earned a place unto itself on the United States’ list of
12 Josh Gerstein, 2IÀFLDO%LQ/DGHQ7DNHV%DFN6HDW, POLITICO, Feb. 9, 2011, (quoting former National
&RXQWHUWHUURULVP&HQWHU'LUHFWRU0LFKDHO/HLWHU 0DWWKHZ&ROH $DURQ.DWHUVN\Awlaki: ‘The Most Dangerous
Man in the World,’ ABC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki-dangerous-man-world/
story?id=12109217.
13 Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A01.
14 Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010 (citing unnamed U.S.
´LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGFRXQWHUWHUURULVPRIÀFLDOVµ Vee also Memo. in Supp. of Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,
No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); James Clapper, Decl. in Supp. of Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege, at ¶¶ 1315, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010).
15 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi Key Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (July 16, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg779.aspx.
16 US Drone Attack in Yemen ‘Missed’ al-Awlaki, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (May 7, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/05/2011572342146775.html.
17 See Mazzetti, supra note 1.
18 JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL
PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 14 (2011). AQAP should not be confused with the Al Qaeda cell operating
in Yemen at the time of the U.S.S. Cole bombing. That attack occurred in 2000, nine years before AQAP’s formation.
Id. at 8.
19 Christine Hauser, Mastermind of U.S.S. Cole Attack Escapes Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006.
20 Id.
 'HVSLWH$4$3·VDSSDUHQWDXWRQRP\XQQDPHG86RIÀFLDOVKDYHUHFHQWO\FODLPHGWKDWDO4DHGDSURSHUKDV
LQFUHDVHGLWVFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWK´VHPLDXWRQRPRXVDIÀOLDWHJURXSV>LQFOXGLQJ$4$3DV@SDUWRI DEURDGHUVWUDWHJ\
WRHVWDEOLVKFORVHUWLHVWRDIÀOLDWHVWKDQHYHUEHIRUHµ'LQD7HPSOH5DVWRQ$O4DLGD$IÀOLDWHV6KRZ*UHDWHU&RRUGLQDWLRQ,
NP5 1RY KWWSZZZQSURUJDOTDLGDDIÀOLDWHVVKRZLQJJUHDWHUFRRUGLQDWLRQ
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designated terrorist organizations.22 It has also been described as having “eclipsed [al-Qaeda] central
as the primary threat to U.S. national security.”23 AQAP’s goals, though, are similar in scale to those
of al-Qaeda. AQAP seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate and also attempts to launch attacks on a
regional and global scale. Since its founding, AQAP has launched attacks targeting both the Yemeni
and Saudi states.24 AQAP and its pre-merger Yemen predecessor have also targeted Western diplomats and installations in Yemen.25
C. Targeted Killings
A targeted killing is the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by [a] State[]
RUE\DQRUJDQL]HGDUPHGJURXSDJDLQVWDVSHFLÀFLQGLYLGXDOZKRLVQRWLQWKHSK\VLFDOFXVtody of the [State employing the targeted killing].”26 A handful of states have embraced targeted
killings and have employed the killings in a variety of contexts, including international armed conÁLFWQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWDQGQRQFRQÁLFWVLWXDWLRQV7KRXJKRQFHFULWLFDORI WDUJHWHG
killings—particularly Israel’s use of targeted killings27—since September 11, 2001, the United States
has vigorously embraced the tactic.28
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV·ÀUVWWDUJHWHGNLOOLQJRXWVLGHRI $IJKDQLVWDQRFFXUUHGRQ1RYHPEHU
in Yemen.29 Since that strike, the United States has engaged in targeted killing in Yemen, Somalia,30
and Pakistan. In Pakistan, U.S. drone strikes, some of which are presumably part of the U.S. targeted killing program, have increased from just nine strikes between 2004 and 2007, to thirty-four
 2IÀFHRI WKH&RRUGLQDWRUIRU&RXQWHUWHUURULVP86'HS·WRI 6WDWH)RUHLJQ7HUURULVW2UJDQL]DWLRQVavailable at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
23 Christopher Boucek, The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL, Sept. 1 2010, at 5.
24 Scott Stewart, AQAP: Paradigm Shifts and Lessons Learned, STRATFOR, Sept. 2, 2009; James Gallagher, AQAP and
Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010, AEI: CRITICAL THREATS (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.criticalthreats.org/
\HPHQDTDSLQWHQVLÀFDWLRQQHDUZDUPDUFK
25 See, e.g., Rollins, supra note 18, at 17 (describing pre-merger militants’ attacks on western embassies in Sana’a,
foreign oil companies and their facilities, and tourists, and assassination attempts on foreigners, including the British
Ambassador and Embassy workers).
26 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); see also KENNETH ANDERSON, TARGETED KILLING IN U.S.
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND LAW   GHÀQLQJWDUJHWHGNLOOLQJDV´WKHWDUJHWLQJRI DVSHFLÀFLQGLYLGXDOWREH
killed”).
27 Joel Greenberg, ,VUDHO$IÀUPV3ROLF\RI $VVDVVLQDWLQJ0LOLWDQWV, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A5 (“‘The United States
government is very clearly on the record as against targeted assassinations,’ [American Amb. to Israel Martin Indyk] said.
‘They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.’”).
28 See, e.g.3HWHU%HUJHQ .DWKHULQH7LHGHPDQQWashington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in
Pakistan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Aug. 2011, at 12–18 (describing the Bush and Obama administrations’ increasing use of
drone attacks); PETER BERGEN & KATHERINE TIEDEMANN, THE YEAR OF THE DRONE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. DRONE STRIKES
IN PAKISTAN, 2004-2010 1 (2010).
29 Norman G. Printer, The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator
Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 332 (2003).
30 Karen DeYoung, U.S. Says Raid in Somalia Killed Terrorist With Links to Al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at A9.
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LQÀIW\WKUHHLQDQGLQ31 While the frequency of drone strikes in Pakistan is
unparalleled, the United States has deployed drones to Yemen,32 threatening to emulate its Pakistan
campaign there.33
The United States maintains at least two targeted killing lists.347KHVSHFLÀFFULWHULDIRULQFOXVLRQ
on either list are not publically known. However, reports indicate that the inclusion of a target on
the CIA’s list is contingent on the target being “‘deemed . . . a continuing threat to U.S. persons or
interests.’”35 According to reports, counterterrorism analysts nominate individuals for addition via
memoranda, in which the analysts make the case for inclusion.36 Such reports also indicate that, once
targeted, an individual is continuously eligible for killing.37
II. CAN THE UNITED STATES RELY ON AN ARMED CONFLICT TO JUSTIFY ITS TARGETING OF ANWAR ALAULAQI?
The United States claims that its targeting of Anwar al-Aulaqi was lawful because of his particiSDWLRQLQDQRQJRLQJDUPHGFRQÁLFW7KHH[LVWHQFHRI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWWULJJHUVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZ³WKHERG\RI ODZWKDWGHÀQHVWKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVRI SDUWLHV
WRDFRQÁLFW7KHVFRSHRI WKDWERG\RI ODZDSSOLFDEOHWRDQ\JLYHQDUPHGFRQÁLFWLVGHWHUPLQHG
E\ZKHWKHUWKDWFRQÁLFWLVRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU7KXVZKLOHDQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWLVVXEMHFWWRWKHIXOOSDQRSO\RI WKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRI DQG
FXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWLVVXEMHFWRQO\WRWKH
less restrictive provisions of Common Article 3 and the customary international law governing nonLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW5HJDUGOHVVRI WKHFKDUDFWHUZKHQDQ\DUPHGFRQÁLFWRFFXUVLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZYHVWVDVWDWHZLWKWKHDXWKRULW\WRXVHIRUFHDVDÀUVWUHVRUWDJDLQVWWKHHQHP\

31 Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (last visited May 17, 2011).
 *UHJ-DIIH .DUHQ'H<RXQJU.S. Drones on Hunt in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2010, at A1.
 $GDP(QWRXV 6LREKDQ*RUPDQU.S. Weighs Expanded Drone Strikes in Yemen, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, at A1.
34 See Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2010, at 12; Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA’s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010 (describing the lists maintained
by JSCO and the CIA). Inclusion on one list does not necessarily indicate inclusion on the other list. For example, alAulaqi was added to the U.S. military’s targeted kill list at least by the end of January 2010; at that point, al-Aulaqi had
not yet been added to the CIA’s targeted kill list.
35 Miller, supra note 34.
36 Id.
37 Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/
inside-the-killing-machine.html. McKelvey quotes former Acting General Counsel for the CIA, John A. Rizzo, as saying,
“‘It’s [the list of targets] basically a hit list.’” Id. The program Rizzo describes is one in which CIA staffers produce
memoranda justifying the targeting of particular individuals. The CIA General Counsel then approves those individuals
for targeting. At that point, the target joins a group of “‘individuals [the United States is] searching for [that the United
States has determined] it is better now to neutralize the threat [those individuals pose].’” Id. It is this process—the
nomination for targeting followed by the search for that target—that suggests targeted individuals become continuously
subject to lethal force. Id.
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ZLWKZKLFKLWLVÀJKWLQJ38
7KXVWKHÀUVWVWHSLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVPD\UHO\RQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLtarian law for authority to kill Anwar al-Aulaqi is to determine whether both the United States and
DO$XODTLSDUWLFLSDWHGLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
$/RFDWLQJDQ$UPHG&RQÁLFW&RPPRQWR$QZDUDO$XODTLDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
7KH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRI FDWHJRUL]HDOODUPHGFRQÁLFWVDVHLWKHUDUPHGFRQÁLFWVRI 
DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW RUDUPHGFRQÁLFWVQRWRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FKDUDFWHU QRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW 39 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions proYLGHVWKDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQV´VKDOODSSO\WRDOOFDVHVRI GHFODUHGZDURURI DQ\RWKHUDUPHGFRQÁLFW
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.”40 Common Article 3 sets forth minimum provisions applicable “in
WKHFDVHRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWQRWRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURFFXUULQJLQWKHWHUULWRU\RI RQHRI WKH
High Contracting Parties . . . .”41
$OWKRXJKWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDGRSWHGWKHWHUP´DUPHGFRQÁLFWµLQOLHXRI WKHWHUP´ZDUµ
QHLWKHU&RPPRQ$UWLFOHQRU&RPPRQ$UWLFOHSURYLGHVDGHÀQLWLRQRI DUPHGFRQÁLFW,QVWHDG
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
DUWLFXODWHGWKHPRVWFRPPRQO\FLWHGFRQWHPSRUDU\GHÀQLWLRQRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWLQ3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý.
7KHUHWKH7ULEXQDOKHOGWKDW´DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWH[LVWVZKHQHYHUWKHUHLVDUHVRUWWRDUPHGIRUFHEHtween States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.”42 The TadicGHÀQLWLRQVHSDUDWHVWKHWZRFDWHJRULHV
RI DUPHGFRQÁLFWUHFRJQL]HGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW³
´UHVRUWWRDUPHGIRUFHEHWZHHQ6WDWHVµ³DQGQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW³´SURWUDFWHGDUPHG
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”
According to the authoritative Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, “[a]ny difference arising
between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed
FRQÁLFWZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI $UWLFOHHYHQLI RQHRI WKH3DUWLHVGHQLHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRI DVWDWH
38 OSCAR M. UHLER & HENRI COURSIER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV
CRPPHQWDU\@ ´%RUQRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGWKH5HG&URVVFDOOHGLQWREHLQJWKH)LUVW*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQWRSURWHFW
wounded and sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little to other categories of war victims, in logical
DSSOLFDWLRQRI LWVIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHLWSRLQWHGWKHZD\ÀUVWWRWKHUHYLVLRQRI WKHRULJLQDO&RQYHQWLRQDQGWKHQWR
the extension of legal protection in turn to prisoners of war and civilians. The same logical process could not fail to
lead to the idea of applying the principle in allFDVHVRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWVLQFOXGLQJLQWHUQDORQHVµ  HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
39 Id.
40 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
art. 2, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
41 Id. at art. 3
 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý&DVH1R,77-XGJPHQW ,QW·O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH)RUPHU<XJRVODYLD0D\ 
FLWLQJ3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý&DVH1R,7'HFLVLRQRQWKH'HIHQFH0RWLRQIRU,QWHUORFXWRU\$SSHDORQ-XULVGLFWLRQ
¶ 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)).
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of war.”43 The duration of the hostilities or the number of wounded or killed does not impact the
FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI DUPHGFRQÁLFW
Although foreign armed forces have intervened in Yemen, nothing indicates that these interventions have been driven by “difference[s] arising between” those states. The hostilities that are taking
place in Yemen are not taking place between Yemen and another state—the government of Yemen
has consented to the U.S. presence in Yemen and has collaberated on U.S. operations there. Thus, it
LVFOHDUWKDWDQ\DUPHGFRQÁLFWWDNLQJSODFHLQ<HPHQLVQRWRQHRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU
,QOLJKWRI WKHDEVHQFHRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWLI WKHUHLVDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWWDNLQJSODFHLQ<HPHQWKHQLWPXVWEHDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW7KHTadic Trial Chamber
H[SODLQHGWKDWWKHLQTXLU\WRGHWHUPLQHWKHH[LVWHQFHRI DQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW´IRFXVHV
RQWZRDVSHFWVRI DFRQÁLFWWKHLQWHQVLW\RI WKHFRQÁLFWDQGWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRI WKHSDUWLHVWRWKH
FRQÁLFWµ44 These two factors “are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an
DUPHGFRQÁLFWIURPEDQGLWU\XQRUJDQL]HGDQGVKRUWOLYHGLQVXUUHFWLRQVRUWHUURULVWDFWLYLWLHVZKLFK
are not subject to international humanitarian law.”45
)RUDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWWRH[LVWWKHLQWHQVLW\RI DUPHGKRVWLOLWLHVPXVWH[FHHG
those associated with banditry or mere internal disturbances. To determine whether hostilities
EHWZHHQDVWDWHDQGDQRQVWDWHDFWRUULVHWRWKHOHYHORI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWWKH,&7<ORRNHGWRWKH
duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the frequency of clashes; the duration of the
FRQÁLFWRYHUDOOWKHW\SHVRI ZHDSRQVDQGRWKHUPLOLWDU\HTXLSPHQWXVHGWKHGHSOR\PHQWRI UHJXODU
armed forces against the non-state actor; the geographic and temporal distribution of the clashes;
and the number of casualties.46
$GGLWLRQDOO\IRUDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWWRH[LVWWKHSXWDWLYHSDUWLHVWRWKDWDUPHG
FRQÁLFWQHHGSRVVHVVRQO\´VRPHGHJUHHRI RUJDQL]DWLRQµ47 Factors considered in examining the
RUJDQL]DWLRQRI DQDUPHGJURXSIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHH[LVWHQFHRI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWKDYHLQFOXGHG
the group’s hierarchal structure; its control and administration of territory; its ability to recruit and
WUDLQÀJKWHUVLWVDELOLW\WRODXQFKDWWDFNVXVLQJPLOLWDU\WDFWLFVDQGLWVDELOLW\WRHQWHULQWRFHDVHÀUH
or peace agreements.48
$SSO\LQJWKHODZRI QRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWWRWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ<HPHQVWURQJO\VXJJHVWV
WKDW<HPHQDQG$4$3DUHHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW+RZHYHUWKHKRVWLOLWLHV
EHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3DUHQRWDORQHVXIÀFLHQWWRSODFHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3
43
44
45

GC IV Commentary, supra note 38, at 20.
7DGLý, IT-94-1-T ¶ 562.
7DGLý, IT-94-1-T ¶ 562 (referencing INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA (Pictet ed.,
1952)).
46 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49,60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2005); 7DGLý, IT-94-1-T, at ¶¶ 564-6.
47 Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 89.
48 Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, at ¶ 60; Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009).
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LQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW6WLOO86LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ<HPHQ·VDUPHGFRQÁLFW³RQEHKDOI RI <HPHQ³OLNHO\GRHVSODFHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3$OWHUQDWLYHO\WKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVPD\EHHQJDJHGLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3EDVHGRQ$4$3·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
DO4DHGDDQGWKHRQJRLQJDUPHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGDO4DHGD
7KHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQVÀUVWH[DPLQHZKHWKHU<HPHQDQG$4$3DUHHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW6HFRQGKRVWLOLWLHVEHWZHHQ$4$3DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUHDQDO\]HGLQLVRODtion of the hostilities taking place between AQAP and Yemen to determine whether they rise to the
OHYHORI DQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW7KLUG86RSHUDWLRQVLQ<HPHQDUHH[DPLQHGZLWKLQ
the context of Yemen-AQAP hostilities to determine if they constitute a foreign-armed intervenWLRQLQDQRQJRLQJQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW)RXUWK$4$3·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKDO4DHGDLV
explored to determine whether that relationship impacts the characterization of hostilities between
the United States and AQAP.
7KH$UPHG&RQÁLFW%HWZHHQ<HPHQDQG$4$3
<HPHQDQG$4$3DUHHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW$4$3·VKLHUDUFKLFDO
VWUXFWXUHLWVDELOLW\WR³DQGIRFXVXSRQ³UHFUXLWLQJÀJKWHUVDQGLWVXVHRI PLOLWDU\WDFWLFVLQGLFDWH
WKDWLWLVVXIÀFLHQWO\RUJDQL]HGWRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW0RUHRYHUWKHRQJRLQJ
hostilities between Yemen and AQAP surpass the level of violence associated with banditry or riots,
WKHUHE\ULVLQJWRWKHOHYHORI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
a. Organizational Capacity of AQAP
$4$3LVVXIÀFLHQWO\RUJDQL]HGWRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW$VGHVFULEHGDERYH
WREHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWDJURXSPXVWSRVVHVVDGHJUHHRI RUJDQL]DWLRQDOWKRXJKWKDWOHYHO
of organization need not rise to the level required to establish command responsibility.49 Rather, the
GHJUHHRI RUJDQL]DWLRQUHTXLUHGPXVWPHUHO\EHVXIÀFLHQWWRGLVWLQJXLVKDQRUJDQL]HGDUPHGJURXS
from a mob engaged in a riot.50 Factors to support the necessary level of organization include posVHVVLQJDKLHUDUFKLFDOVWUXFWXUHUHFUXLWLQJDQGWUDLQLQJÀJKWHUVDQGHPSOR\LQJPLOLWDU\WDFWLFV$4$3
H[KLELWVDOORI WKRVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV7DNHQWRJHWKHUWKHVHIDFWRUVVXJJHVWWKDW$4$3LVVXIÀFLHQWO\
RUJDQL]HGWRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
Hierarchy
AQAP does not possess the rigid hierarchy generally associated with regular armed forces.
Instead, it mimics the al-Qaeda model of “‘centralization of decisions and decentralization of

49 Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 90.
50 Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF
WAR A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 16-17 (2009); see also Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of
Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 197–99 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1964).
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execution.’”51 Importantly, this structure is not indicative of organizational failings on the part of
$4$3EXWUDWKHUDUHVSRQVHWRWKHQDWXUHRI WKHFRQÁLFWLQZKLFK$4$3LVLQYROYHG52 Thus, Nahir al-Wihayshi, emir of AQAP, is responsible for approving all AQAP suicide strikes in Yemen and
attacks abroad—with input from a senior council of advisers53—but AQAP’s various operational
units are “an alliance of components,”54 drawn together through either tribal or ideological linkages.55 This structure is designed to lend the group robustness so that it might survive a decapitation
strike in contrast to the al-Qaeda cell that operated in Yemen immediately following the 9/11 attacks.56
The operational decentralization of AQAP makes its structure analogous to the structure emSOR\HGE\WKH.RVRYR/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\ ./$ ZKLFKWKH,&7<IRXQGWREHVXIÀFLHQWO\RUJDQL]HG
WRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW57 Like AQAP, the KLA possessed a central command
but delegated operational responsibility to local commanders responsible for fairly large portions of
territory.58 In fact, the KLA arguably delegated more operational responsibility to local commanders than does AQAP. Whereas al-Wihayshi reportedly personally approves AQAP operations, local
KLA commanders were merely obligated “to inform the General Staff about all developments in
their respective areas of responsibility.”59
In its analysis, the ICTY also emphasized the increasing organizational strength of the KLA
over time.60 Similarly, over the last four years, AQAP has “transformed itself from a fractured and
fragmented group of individuals into an organization that is intent on launching attacks throughout the Arabian Peninsula.”61 At the same time, AQAP attacks within Yemen have been “strik-

51 Gregory D. Johnsen, The Impact of Bin Laden’s Death on AQAP in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL May 2011, at 9.
52 Cf. Limaj,77DW ´,QWKH&KDPEHU·VÀQGLQJWKHHYLGHQFHGRHVQRWHVWDEOLVKWKHQRQH[LVWHQFHRI 
D./$RUJDQLVDWLRQDO>VLF@VWUXFWXUH5DWKHULWUHÁHFWVWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKH./$RSHUDWHGDWWKHWLPH7KH
KLA was effectively an underground organisation [sic], operating in conditions of secrecy out of concern to preserve its
leadership, and under constant threat of military action by the Serbian forces.”).
53 Johnsen, supra note 51, at 9.
54 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM, Mar. 22, 2011, at 15.
55 See id. DW QRWLQJWKHYDULHGDQGVRPHWLPHVFRQÁLFWLQJLGHRORJLHVLQÁXHQFLQJ$4$3 see also Ryan Evans, From
Iraq to Yemen: Al-Qa’ida’s Shifting Strategies, CTC SENTINEL, Oct. 2010, at 11, 13–14 (asserting that AQAP has consolidated
tribal support in some regions by adopting local grievances against the Yemeni government).
56 See Johnsen, supra note 51, at 9 (providing a brief description of the United States attacks against Al-Qaeda in
Yemen in the months after 9/11); see also Gregory D. Johnsen, The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,
CTC SENTINEL, Jan. 2010, at 4, 6 (“[A]l-Qa’ida [in the Arabian Peninsula] has been working single-mindedly to create a
durable infrastructure that can withstand the loss of key leaders and cells.”).
57 Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 134..
58 Cf. id. at ¶ 95 (“[T]he territory of Kosovo was divided by the KLA into seven zones . . . . Each zone had a
commander and covered the territory of several municipalities. The level of organisation [sic] and development in each
]RQHZDVÁXLGDQGGHYHORSLQJDQGQRWDOO]RQHVKDGWKHVDPHOHYHORI RUJDQLVDWLRQ>VLF@DQGGHYHORSPHQWµ 
59 See id. at ¶¶ 97–98 (noting that KLA commanders generally—but not absolutely—complied with directions from
the KLA’s General Staff).
60 See id. at ¶ 129 (referring to the increased political power of the KLA in Kosovo).
61 Johnsen, The Expansion Strategy, supra note 56, at 4.
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ingly consistent”62 with the group’s stated objectives: targeting foreigners, the Yemeni state, and oil
infrastructure while avoiding Yemeni civilians63 and exhibiting strong operational coordination and
FRQVLVWHQF\DIDFWRUWKH,&7<IRXQGVLJQLÀFDQWZKHQDVVHVVLQJWKH./$·VRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFDSDFLW\64
Indeed, AQAP may well have evolved from primarily a terrorist organization to “an insurgent group
willing to wage guerrilla war and contest control of portions of the Yemeni hinterland with the
Yemeni government.”65 Though the ability to contest control of Yemeni territory does not rise to
the KLA’s ability to exert administrative control over portions of Kosovo,66 it certainly distinguishes
AQAP from a riotous mob.
Also like the KLA, AQAP maintains a propaganda and public relations operation.67 Upon its
formation, AQAP released a statement describing its goals, objectives, and leadership structure.68
Since then, it has operated both Arabic-language and English-language publications, including both
Sada al-Malahim and Inspire, which extol the group’s operations and seek to inspire potential recruits
to join AQAP. Additionally, AQAP consciously and, according to one observer, “shrewd[ly],”69 employs “soft power” to strengthen its position in Yemen while avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued
RWKHUDO4DHGDOLQNHGJURXSVVXFKDVDOLHQDWLQJWKHORFDOFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQRULQWHUQHFLQHÀJKWLQJ70
Recruiting Fighters
In determining that the KLA had the necessary degree of organization to be a party to a non-inWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWWKH,&7<HPSKDVL]HGWKH./$·V´FRQVLVWHQWHIIRUWWRSHUVXDGHSHRSOHWR
join the organisation [sic].”71$4$3KDVVLPLODUO\PRXQWHGDFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWWRUHFUXLWÀJKWHUVWR
its cause. It publishes Arabic-language and English-language magazines online to reach out to local
DQGIRUHLJQÀJKWHUV72 As such, and due in part to its media-wing’s ability to capitalize on a botched
62 Boucek, supra note 23, at 5–6.
63 See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 54; Evans, supra note 55, at 13–14; Boucek, supra note 23, at 5–6; W.
ANDREW TERRILL, THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 55 (2011).
64 See Limaj,77DW UHFRJQL]LQJWKDWWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI 5HJXODWLRQVWR./$XQLWVZDVDVLJQLÀFDQWVWHS
in developing greater coordination and consistency between the KLA and the units).
65 W. ANDREW TERRILL, THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 62–63 (2011) (discussing AQAP forces’
ZLOOLQJQHVVWRUHPDLQDQGÀJKWWKH<HPHQLPLOLWDU\LQWKH$XJXVWEDWWOHLQ/RGHU 
66 See generally, Limaj, IT-03-66-T (discussing how the General Staff of the KLA maintained control of occupied
´]RQHVµ 1RWHKRZHYHUWKDW$4$3·VDELOLW\WRDGPLQLVWHUWHUULWRU\LVLQÁX[$VWKHVWUHQJWKRI WKH<HPHQLVWDWH
recedes, AQAP reportedly polices the territory that it has taken and held.
67 See, e.g., Boucek, supra note 23, at 6 (describing AQAP’s media strategy as “highly sophisticated”).
68 See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 54.
 %DUDN%DUÀAQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL, Nov. 2010, at 1.
70 See id. at 1–5 (discussing how AQAP has used a more practical approach in dealing with disputes local tribes rather
than the typical hard-line approach); TERRILL, supra note 63 (noting that much of the Yemeni population do not view alQaeda as a serious threat because they do not target Yemeni civilians).
71 Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 118.
72 See, e.g., Chris Harnisch, The Continued al Qaeda Threat from Yemen, DAILY CALLER (Nov. 1, 2010), http://dailycaller.
com/2010/11/01/the-continued-al-qaeda-threat-from-yemen/ (noting that Al-Qaeda has released two issues of an
English language magazine, “Inspire”).
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U.S. airstrike, AQAP is stronger today than it was in December 2009.73 AQAP has also bolstered its
ranks by co-opting local Yemeni concerns and through strategic intermarriage with various Yemeni
tribes. In particular, AQAP has concentrated on recruiting secessionist-minded southern Yemenis,
disaffected by the Saleh regime.74 These strategies have allowed AQAP to grow from a few dozen
ÀJKWHUVWRVHYHUDOKXQGUHGVLQFHWKHJURXS·VIRUPDWLRQ75
AQAP’s strategy of attacking Yemeni government targets that collocated in the region of Yemen
LQÁXHQFHGE\WKHVHFHVVLRQLVW6RXWKHUQ0RYHPHQWKDVIXUWKHUHGWKHJURXS·VUHFUXLWPHQWHIIRUWV76
AQAP attacks have incited a heavy-handed and coarse Yemeni government response, which in turn
enrages local civilians who already oppose the Yemeni state, encouraging them to join AQAP.77
Employing Attacks Using Military Tactics
Beginning in late 2009, AQAP began a gradually intensifying campaign targeting the state of
Yemen. AQAP now regularly attacks targets associated with the state of Yemen.78 While some of
WKHVHDWWDFNVLQYROYHWKHXVHRI VXLFLGHERPEHUVRURWKHUDFWVRI SHUÀG\79 most employ common
military tactics like ambushes using small arms, mortars, and rocket propelled grenades. AQAP targets convoys of Yemeni troops, military installations, as well as infrastructure. For example, on May
$4$3PLOLWDQWVÀUHGDURFNHWSURSHOOHGJUHQDGHDWDQDUP\YHKLFOHNLOOLQJÀYH<HPHQL
soldiers;80 on April 26, 2011, AQAP militants ambushed a Yemeni Republican Guard convoy, killing
eight Republican Guard soldiers;81 and on March 26, 2011, AQAP militants sacked a weapons factory and seized control of two towns, a presidential palace, and a radio station.82 Importantly, these
attacks have not just been harassment operations but have resulted in AQAP control of Yemeni
towns and, in some cases, whole districts—in fact, on March 31, 2011, AQAP seized control of
73 See Johnsen, The Impact of Bin Laden’s Death, supra note 51, at 9 (explaining how al-Qaeda used a botched bombing
raid in the southern Yemeni village of al-Majalla to bolster support).
74 See Ronan McGee, Why Awlaki Should Not be the Focus of Concern in Yemen, INT’L AFFAIRS REV. (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/165 (“AQAP has been attempting to recruit southerners disenchanted with the grim
economic and political conditions—conditions caused largely by the government’s policies.”).
75 See Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at
A01.
76 TERRILL, supra note 63, at 59–60.
77 Id. at 61.
78 Id. at 62-65. See also AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010 and 2011, AEI CRITICAL THREATS,
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010 (providing information
on al Qaeda’s continued insurgency in Yemen and attacks for which AQAP has taken credit and incidents attributed to
AQAP by the government).
79 For example, on June 19, 2009, four AQAP militants, dressed as women, attacked the Yemeni intelligence
headquarters in Aden. 6HH$O4DHGDLQWKH$UDELDQ3HQLQVXODLQ7KH,QWHQVLÀFDWLRQRI WKH1HDU:DU, AEI CRITICAL
THREATSKWWSZZZFULWLFDOWKUHDWVRUJ\HPHQDTDSLQWHQVLÀFDWLRQQHDUZDUPDUFK
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
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Abyan governorate and declared it an Islamic emirate.83
AQAP’s tactics—targeting police and security forces, laying ambushes, and making use of small
DUPVDQGPRUWDUVRUURFNHWSURSHOOHGJUHQDGHV³DUHWKHVDPHWDFWLFVWKDWWKH,&7<IRXQGVXIÀFLHQW
indicia of organizational strength in the Limaj case.84 Also like the KLA, AQAP conducts operations over a wide swath of territory. AQAP attacks have occurred in nine of Yemen’s twenty-one
governorates85 —governorates that cover some 366,269 square kilometers—an area about 30 times
as large as the KLA’s total operating area. The ability of AQAP to consistently launch attacks over
such a large amount of territory is another indication of its organizational capacity.86
%DVHGRQLWVKLHUDUFKLFDOVWUXFWXUHFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWWRUHFUXLWÀJKWHUVDQGLWVHPSOR\PHQWRI 
PLOLWDU\WDFWLFVLQODXQFKLQJDWWDFNV$4$3LVVXIÀFLHQWO\RUJDQL]HGWRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHG
FRQÁLFW87
b. Intensity of Hostilities between Yemen and AQAP
Several factors when combined strongly suggest that the hostilities between Yemen and AQAP
DUHVXIÀFLHQWWRULVHWRWKHOHYHORI DQDUPHGFRPEDW)RULQVWDQFHWKHLQWHQVLW\RI LQGLYLGXDOFODVKHV
and the rate of hostilities between the Yemeni government and AQAP militants, as well as the duraWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFWDVDZKROHVXJJHVWWKDWLWLVQRWVLPSO\DUHEHOXSULVLQJ)XUWKHUPRUH<HPHQ·V
UHVRUWWRXVHRI LWVUHJXODUDUPHGIRUFHVWKHÁLJKWRI FLYLOLDQVDQG$4$3·VFDSWXUHRI <HPHQLWHUULWRU\OHQGFUHGHQFHWRWKHQRWLRQWKDWKRVWLOLWLHVKDYHUHDFKHGWKHOHYHORI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
7KHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ$4$3DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI <HPHQKDVEHHQRQJRLQJVLQFH,QGLvidual confrontations have been both sustained and sudden. For example, on June 12, 2010, AQAP
JXQPHQUHSRUWHGO\DWWDFNHGDQGNLOOHGDVHQLRUVHFXULW\RIÀFLDORXWVLGHKLVKRPH88 Such drive-by
DVVDVVLQDWLRQVRI VHFXULW\VHUYLFHRIÀFLDOVKDYHEHFRPHFRPPRQSODFH89 Other clashes, though, have
involved large-scale Yemeni military operations, sieges of towns held by AQAP, and the displace-

83 Yemen: Al Qaeda Declares South Province as “Islamic Emirate,” EURASIA REVIEW (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.
eurasiareview.com/yemen-al-qaeda-declares-south-province-as-islamic-emirate-31032011/.
84 See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
30, 2005).
85 See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79 (indicating AQAP attacks have taken place in Abyan, Adan, Bayda,
Hadramaut, Jawf, Lahij, Ma’rib, Sana’a, and Shabwah governorates).
86 Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
30, 2005).
87 Cf. id. at ¶ 171.
88 See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supraQRWH FLWLQJVSHFLÀFDOO\WKH-XQHDWWDFNDQGUHIHUHQFLQJRWKHUGDWHVLQ
which militants have attempted drive-by assassinations).
89 See id.
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ment of thousands of civilians.90)RUH[DPSOHDÀYHGD\<HPHQLRIIHQVLYHDJDLQVW$4$3PLOLWDQWV
in September 2010 displaced at least 15,000 civilians.91
The rate of hostilities between the Yemeni government and AQAP militants has increased
steadily between 2009 and 2011. While there were only a handful of clashes between Yemen and
$4$3LQDOORI DQGIHZHUWKDQWZHQW\LQWKHÀUVWKDOI RI WKHUHZHUHQHDUO\HLJKW\UHSRUWed clashes in the second half of 2010, and there have been nearly sixty in 2011.92 In these attacks,
AQAP has demonstrated “operational boldness and sophistication.”93 The Yemeni government has
“declared war on AQAP” 94 and attempted to recapture towns and other territory from AQAP.95 In
its attempts to oust AQAP, Yemen has deployed its regular armed forces alongside its civilian security forces.967KRVHIRUFHVKDYHHPSOR\HGKHDY\ZHDSRQVLQGLFDWLYHRI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWLQFOXGLQJ
tanks, artillery, and the Yemeni air force.97
The increase in the hostilities between AQAP and the Yemeni government, the frequency with
which they occur,98 the government’s use of its regular armed forces, and the government’s “declaration of war” all indicate that the government of Yemen and AQAP are engaged in a non-internaWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW

90 See, e.g., Al-Qaeda Fighters Seize Yemeni City, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, (May 29, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/05/201152815531552947.html (describing clashes that displaced “thousands” of civilians); Nasser
Arrabyee, Four al-Qaeda Fighters Killed as Army Starts All-Out Attack in Al Huta, YEMEN OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2010), http://
www.yobserver.com/front-page/10019720.html (detailing an attack outside the town of Al Huta that prompted 300
ORFDOIDPLOLHVWRÁHH %RXFHNsupra note 23, at 5-7 (describing the Yemeni government’s use of “large-scale” offensives
against suspected AQAP operatives).
91 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, CRISIS WATCH NO. 86, Oct. 1, 2010, at 11.
92 See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79 (detailing seventy-seven AQAP attacks between June 7, 2010 and Dec. 25,
2010, and sixty attacks between Jan. 1, 2011 and Oct. 11, 2011).
93 Fawaz A. Gerges, Yemen’s Summer of Discontent, THE MAJALLA (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.majalla.com/
eng/2010/08/article55113178.
94 Yemen Declares War on AQAP, UPI.COM (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/01/07/
Yemen-declares-war-on-AQAP/UPI-16041262890800/.
95 See 0RQD(O1DJJDU 5REHUW):RUWKYemen’s Drive on Al Qaeda Faces Internal Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
 ´2QHWKLQJLVFOHDU<HPHQ·VSUHVLGHQW$OL$EGXOODK6DOHKKDVVWHSSHGXSKLVFRPPLWPHQWWRÀJKWLQJDO4DHGD
in the past year, with far more military raids and airstrikes, including some carried out by the American military. His
government has paid a price. On Saturday, a day after the discovery of the air freight bomb plot, Mr. Saleh said during a
QHZVFRQIHUHQFHWKDWDO4DHGDKDGNLOOHGSROLFHRIÀFHUVDQGVROGLHUVLQWKHSDVWIRXUZHHNV7KDWLVDVKDUSLQFUHDVH
over previous years, and some analysts have taken it as proof that al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch is growing.”).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Jeffery Fleishman, Yemen Pursues Al Qaeda Munitions Expert Linked to Package Bomb Plot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2010, at A3 (describing Yemeni Special Forces’ search for a Saudi-born bomb maker implicated in a threat to United
States-bound planes); Laura Kasinof, Yemen’s Delicate Dance Between US Pressure, Al Qaeda Threat, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 2, 2010 (describing Yemen’s use of military jets and air strikes); Laura Kasinof, Yemen Goes On Offensive Against Al
Qaeda, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sep. 22, 2010 (describing Yemen’s use of tanks against AQAP).
98 See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79.
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$UPHG&RQÁLFW%HWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3$ORQH
9LHZHGLQLVRODWLRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3DUHOLNHO\QRWHQJDJHGLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
:KHWKHUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVHQJDJHGLQDQLVRODWHGDUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3WXUQVRQWKHVDPH
IDFWRUVDVZKHWKHU$4$3DQG<HPHQDUHHQJDJHGLQVXFKDFRQÁLFW1DPHO\ZKHWKHU$4$3KDV
VXIÀFLHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQWREHDSDUW\WRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWDQGZKHWKHUWKHKRVWLOLWLHVEHWZHHQ$4$3
DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUHVXIÀFLHQWO\LQWHQVHWRFRQVWLWXWHDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW$VVXPLQJWKDW$4$3
LVRUJDQL]HGHQRXJKWRFRQVWLWXWHDSDUW\WRDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW99 the intensity of the
hostilities between the United States and AQAP likely do not rise to the level necessary for an armed
FRQÁLFW
In examining the intensity of hostilities, international humanitarian law seeks to separate the
YLROHQFHRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWIURPWKHYLROHQFHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKULRWVRUEDQGLWU\$VVXFKWKHLQWHQVLW\
analysis examines the seriousness of the hostilities, considering such factors as the number, the duration, and the intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons employed; the number of
persons and the types of forces engaged in clashes; the territory that has been captured and held; the
QXPEHURI FDVXDOWLHVWKHH[WHQWRI PDWHULDOGHVWUXFWLRQDQGWKHQXPEHURI FLYLOLDQVZKRKDYHÁHG
ÀJKWLQJ2WKHUUHOHYDQWIDFWRUVLQFOXGHZKHWKHUWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOKDVWDNHQQRWLFHRI WKH
ÀJKWLQJZKHWKHUWKHVWDWHKDVUHVRUWHGWRLWVUHJXODUDUPHGIRUFHVWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFWDQG
the frequency of hostilities.100
While U.S. strikes against AQAP targets have involved the deployment of regular armed forces
DQGWKHXVHRI ZHDSRQVJHQHUDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDUPHGFRQÁLFWVWKHVHDLUVWULNHVKDYHEHHQLQIUHquent and sporadic, not sustained and prolonged. Similarly, AQAP has only infrequently attacked—
or attempted to attack—the United States. Since 2009, the United States has reportedly conducted
just a handful of airstrikes in Yemen.101 During the same period, only three reported AQAP-linked
operations have directly targeted areas within the United States.102 AQAP has not captured any territory possessed by the United States, and the United States has not reportedly ousted AQAP from
any territory it has captured in Yemen. Finally, there have been no reports of civilians in either the
8QLWHG6WDWHVRU<HPHQEHLQJGLVSODFHGE\ÀJKWLQJEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3
8QOLNHZKHUHWKH,&7<IRXQGDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWWRH[LVWWKHVHLQIUHTXHQWDLUVWULNHVE\WKH
United States and disparate attempted terrorist attacks by AQAP do not rise to the level of intense
KRVWLOLWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW+RZHYHUZKHQRQHFRQVLGHUV86RSHUDWLRQVDJDLQVW
$4$3ZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI WKHRQJRLQJDUPHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ<HPHQDQG$4$3LWDSSHDUVWKDW
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVLQWHUYHQLQJLQWKDWDUPHGFRQÁLFW6XFKLQWHUYHQWLRQWUDQVIRUPVWKHKRVWLOLWLHV
99 See supra Part II.A.1.a (asserting that AQAP is sophisticated enough to constitute a party to a “non-international
DUPHGFRQÁLFWµ 
100 See gen. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T at ¶¶ 49,60; Limaj, IT-03-66-T at ¶ 90; Tadić, IT-94-1-T, at ¶¶ 564-6.
101 See 6FRWW6KDQH0DUN0D]]HWWL 5REHUW):RUWKA Secret Assault on Terror Widens on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010 (describing a May 25, 2010 airstrike in Yemen as the fourth U.S. airstrike in Yemen since December 17,
2009).
102 See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, REPORT ON AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, available at http://www.
nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last accessed Nov. 19, 2011).
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EHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3LQWRDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
$UPHG&RQÁLFW%HWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$37KURXJK86,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ<HPHQ
United States operations in Yemen, including airstrikes targeting AQAP on behalf of the YePHQLJRYHUQPHQWFRQVWLWXWHDQDUPHGLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWR<HPHQ·VQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
6XFKDQLQWHUYHQWLRQSODFHVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3MXVW
DV<HPHQLVHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3
$UPHGLQWHUYHQWLRQE\DWKLUGSDUW\VWDWHLQWRDQRQJRLQJQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
FRPSOLFDWHVWKHFKDUDFWHURI WKDWDUPHGFRQÁLFW103 affecting the scope of the applicable international humanitarian law.104'HSHQGLQJRQWKHFRQÀJXUDWLRQRI WKHSDUWLHVWRWKHDUPHGFRQÁLFW
intervention will have one of two possible effects. Armed intervention in support of a non-state
DFWRUDJDLQVWWKHWHUULWRULDOVWDWHZLOOLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]HDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWSODFLQJWKHLQWHUYHQLQJVWDWH
DQGWKHWHUULWRULDOVWDWHLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW105 For example, many view the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks as an intervention of a third
state on behalf of a non-state actor. The Northern Alliance, a non-state actor, had been engaged in
a civil war against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan since the mid-1990s.106 Once the United States
LQWHUYHQHGLQHDUO\2FWREHUWKHDUPHGFRQÁLFWZDVLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]HGEHFDXVHWZRVWDWHV³WKH
United States and Afghanistan—were engaged in hostilities with each other.107
Alternatively, armed intervention in support of a state government against a non-state actor puts

103 See generally ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 17–25 (1993) (discussing the
OHJDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRI FRQVHQWLQUHVSHFWWRIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQÁLFWV 
104 See, e.g, Anwar T. Frangi, 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDOL]HG1RQLQWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQÁLFWLQ/HEDQRQ²,QWURGXFWLRQ
WR&RQÁLJRORJ\, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (1993) (distinguishing four different types of internationalized
QRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW 'HQLVH%LQGVFKHGOHU5REHUW$5HFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKH/DZRI $UPHG&RQÁLFWV, in
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 52–53 (1971) (explaining
the difference between foreign intervention on behalf of a sovereign state and foreign intervention on behalf of
insurgents).
105 Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 104, at 52, 85–87; Dietrich Schindler, International Humanitarian Law and
,QWHUQDWLRQDOL]HG,QWHUQDO$UPHG&RQÁLFWV, 64 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 255, 258–60 (1982); see also3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý&DVH1R
IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
106 Although the Taliban government of Afghanistan was only recognized by three states, it was, at least, the de facto
JRYHUQPHQWRI $IJKDQLVWDQ86UHFRJQLWLRQRI LWVLQLWLDOLQYDVLRQRI $IJKDQLVWDQDVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
indicates that the United States accepted that the Taliban government was the government of Afghanistan. Geoffrey S.
Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 4
(Michael Lewis et al. eds., 2009).
107 See id. QRWLQJWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVXOWLPDWHO\FRQFHGHGWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH
7DOLEDQJRYHUQPHQWRI $IJKDQLVWDQZDVDQLQWHUVWDWHDUPHGFRQÁLFW YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 14 (2004).
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WKHLQWHUYHQLQJVWDWHDQGWKHQRQVWDWHDFWRULQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW108 Thus, followLQJWKH7DOLEDQ·VRXVWHUDQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI WKH.DU]DLJRYHUQPHQWWKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKHQRZLQVXUJHQW7DOLEDQEHFDPHDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKWKH
United States intervening on behalf of the Karzai government.109
This was also true in 1979 when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan on behalf of
the government of Afghanistan against the mujahideen. The Soviet Union became entrenched in a
QRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKWKHmujahideen.1101RWZLWKVWDQGLQJVLJQLÀFDQWFRPSOLFDWLQJ
circumstances,111 the Soviet intervention was clearly in opposition to the mujahideen and in defense of
the Soviet-style government then in place in Afghanistan, even if the Soviet Union had orchestrated
a change in that government’s leadership. Thus, the Soviet intervention is most often viewed as an
intervention on behalf of a government against the non-state actor challenging it, placing the USSR
LQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKWKHmujahideen.
7KRXJKWKLVELIXUFDWHGDSSURDFKWRWKHFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWVLQZKLFKIRUHLJQ
states intervene is—and has long been—disputed,112 it is the majority view and the one endorsed by
International Committee for the Red Cross and, implicitly, by the International Court of Justice. Indeed, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ separately
FKDUDFWHUL]HGWKHDUPHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ1LFDUDJXDDQGWKHcontrasDQGWKHSRWHQWLDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
between Nicaragua and the United States:
7KHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKHcontras’ forces and those of the government of Nicaragua was an
DUPHGFRQÁLFW´QRWRI DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUµ7KHDFWVRI WKHcontras towards the Nicaraguan
*RYHUQPHQWZHUHWKHUHIRUHJRYHUQHGE\WKHODZDSSOLFDEOHWRFRQÁLFWVRI WKDWFKDUDFWHUZKHUHDV
the actions of the United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to internaWLRQDOFRQÁLFWV113
As was the case with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, U.S. operations in Yemen target
PHPEHUVRI DQRUJDQL]HGDUPHGJURXSHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKJRYHUQment of the territorial state. Though the scale of the U.S. intervention in Yemen is markedly different than the scale of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, this difference in degree is irrelevant.
108 See Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 104, at 52; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE
7 (2005); Jelena Pejic, 6WDWXVRI $UPHG&RQÁLFWV, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (OL]DEHWK:LOPVKXUVW 6XVDQ%UHDXHGV 
109 See, e.g./DXULH5%ODQN %HQMDPLQ5)DUOH\Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged
LQDQ$UPHG&RQÁLFW", 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 178-184 (2011); Geoffrey S. Corn, 0DNLQJWKH&DVHIRU&RQÁLFW%LIXUFDWLRQ
LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ7UDQVQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQÁLFW$O4DHGDDQGWKH/LPLWVRI WKH$VVRFLDWHG0LOLWLD&RQFHSW, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 181,
181–82 (2009); Hans-Peter Gasser, ,QWHUQDWLRQDOL]HG1RQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQÁLFWV&DVH6WXGLHVRI $IJKDQLVWDQ.DPSXFKHD
and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 150–52 (1983).
110 See Gasser, supra note 109, at 148–52.
111 See TANCA, supra note 103, at 176–77 (1993); see also Gasser, supra note 109, at 148–52. But see0LFKDHO5HLVPDQ 
James Silk, :KLFK/DZ$SSOLHVWRWKH$IJKDQ&RQÁLFW, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 459, 466–74 (1988).
112 For example, Bindschedler-Robert notes that “[t]his distinction between the international and internal aspects
RI WKHFRQÁLFW>LQZKLFKDIRUHLJQVWDWHKDVLQWHUYHQHG@LVGLVSXWHG,WLVRIWHQGLIÀFXOWWRDSSO\LQSUDFWLFHµ
Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 108, at 53.
113 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27).
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Instead, the relevant considerations here are whether Yemen is engaged in a non-international armed
FRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3DQGZKHWKHUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVHPSOR\LQJIRUFHLQVXSSRUWRI WKHJRYHUQPHQW
RI <HPHQLQWKDWDUPHGFRQÁLFW7KXVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVLQWHUYHQLQJLQ<HPHQ·VQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3LQVXSSRUWRI <HPHQ'XHWRWKDWLQWHUYHQWLRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVLQ
DQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3HYHQWKRXJKWKHKRVWLOLWLHVEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
DQG$4$3VWDQGLQJDORQHDUHLQVXIÀFLHQWWRFRQVWLWXWHDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW
$UPHG&RQÁLFW%HWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3EHFDXVHRI WKH86$O4DHGD$UPHG&RQÁLFW
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKDO4DHGD114 If the
relationship between al-Qaeda and AQAP can be characterized as co-belligerency, then hostilities
EHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG$4$3ZRXOGEHDQH[WHQVLRQRI WKDWDUPHGFRQÁLFW
,QLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWFREHOOLJHUHQF\GHVFULEHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSDPRQJVWDWHVFRRSHUDWLYHO\HQJDJHGLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWDJDLQVWRQHRUPRUHRSSRVLQJVWDWHV115$QDUPHGFRQÁLFW
EHWZHHQWZRVWDWHVSODFHVHDFKVWDWHLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWKLWVRSSRVLQJVWDWH·VFREHOOLJHUHQWV116
States may achieve co-belligerency through formal processes such as treaties of alliance.117 A state
may also become a co-belligerent through an informal process of “provid[ing] help and succor only
in a limited way to a principal belligerent”118 or by “mak[ing] common cause” with a belligerent.119
&REHOOLJHUHQF\LVXQNQRZQLQQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW120 However, Bradley and Goldsmith have suggested that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force should be interpreted in
light of the customary principles of co-belligerency.121 That is, they suggest grafting the concept
RI FREHOOLJHUHQF\RQWRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW%UDGOH\DQG*ROGVPLWK·VDSSURDFKZDV
rejected in obiter dicta by a recent panel decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Co114 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–632 (2006).
115 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 693-695 (1968); L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 206
(1935); see also HENRY HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND
WAR 3 (1908).
116 See, e.g., HALLECK, supra, note 115, at 3, (“We have the same rights of war against co-allies or associates as against
the principal belligerent.”).
117 Cf. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE 206 n.3 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Longmans, 5th ed. 1935)
(1905) (asserting that co-belligerents are not necessarily allies and that they can be associated for the sole purpose of war
even if actions have yet to arise or there is no agreement as to when the war will be terminated).
118 2 id. (examining minimal ways in which a state can act as an associate to a principal belligerent).
119 See HENRY HALLECK, SIR G. SHERSTON BAKER & MAURICE DRUCQUER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING
THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 11-12 (4th ed. 1908) (citing Vattel); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 137-143 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (abjuring the formalized
relationship between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in favor of an examination of the actual interactions between the
armed forces of the two states to determine whether they were co-belligerents).
120 Cf. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 117, at 203 (“According to the Law of Nations, full sovereign States alone possess the
OHJDOTXDOLÀFDWLRQWREHFRPHEHOOLJHUHQWVµ
121 See&XUWLV$%UDGOH\ -DFN/*ROGVPLWKCongressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2047, 2113 (2005) (suggesting that the laws of war would deem “neutrals” assisting terrorist organizations and
systematically violating the law of neutrality as co-belligerents analogous to a traditional war).
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lumbia Circuit.122 Moreover, it has yet to gain much traction among international law scholars.123
Yet, there may be good reason to extend the concept of co-belligerency to non-international
DUPHGFRQÁLFW&XUUHQWO\DVWDWHWKDWLQWHUYHQHVLQVXSSRUWRI DVWDWHHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWLVVLPLODUO\SODFHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW124 A state that intervenes
LQVXSSRUWRI DQRQVWDWHDFWRUDJDLQVWDQRWKHUVWDWHLVSODFHGLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
with that state.125 Moreover, two states supporting opposing non-state actors engaged in a nonLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWDUHSODFHGLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWLI WKRVHWZRVWDWHVHQJDJH
in hostilities against each other. However, similar intervention or support by one non-state group on
EHKDOI RI DQRWKHUQRQVWDWHJURXSHQJDJHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\SODFHWKHLQWHUYHQLQJQRQVWDWHJURXSLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW,QVRPHVHQVHWKHQH[WHQGLQJ
FREHOOLJHUHQF\WRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWPHUHO\UHFRJQL]HVWKHUHDOLVWLFGLPHQVLRQVDQG
FRQÀJXUDWLRQVRI PRGHUQDUPHGFRQÁLFW126
$GGLWLRQDOO\H[WHQGLQJWKHFRQFHSWRI FREHOOLJHUHQF\WRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
would not be as radical a shift as the D.C. Circuit intimates. Oppenheim’s restriction of co-belligerency—really, belligerency—to States was not made in contradistinction to non-states but instead to
“half and part sovereign States.”127 Oppenheim even recognized that those “half and part” states,
GLVTXDOLÀHGIURPEHFRPLQJde jure belligerents, could become belligerents in fact.128 It follows logi122 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). (“[E]ven if Al-Bihani’s argument were relevant to his
detention and putting aside all the questions that applying such elaborate rules to this situation would raise, the laws of
co-belligerency affording notice of war and the choice to remain neutral have only applied to nation states. The 55th
FOHDUO\ZDVQRWDVWDWHEXWUDWKHUDQLUUHJXODUÀJKWLQJIRUFHSUHVHQWZLWKLQWKHERUGHUVRI $IJKDQLVWDQDWWKHVDQFWLRQRI 
the Taliban. Any attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be folly, akin to this court ascribing
powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of the Freemasons.”).
123 But see David Mortlock, 'HÀQLWH'HWHQWLRQ7KH6FRSHRI WKH3UHVLGHQW·V$XWKRULW\WR'HWDLQ(QHP\&RPEDWDQWV, 4 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 375, 395 (2010) (condoning the United States’ targeting of organizations that have an actual relationship
ZLWKDO4DHGDDQGUHSHDWHGO\YLRODWHVWKHODZRI QHXWUDOLW\LQWKHRQJRLQJFRQÁLFWGHHPLQJWKHVHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDVFR
belligerants).
124 4 JELENA PEJIC, 6WDWXVRI $UPHG&RQÁLFWV, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (OL]DEHWK:LOPVKXUVW 6XVDQ%UHDXHGV 
125 Id.; see also Sylvain Vite, 7\SRORJ\RI $UPHG&RQÁLFWVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ/HJDO&RQFHSWVDQG$FWXDO
Situations, 91 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 85-87 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
GRFXPHQWVDUWLFOHUHYLHZUHYLHZSKWP QRWLQJWKDWWKH¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ·RI WKHLQWHUQDOFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQD
non state actor and the government is favored by the International Court of Justice).
126 See, e.g., M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Approach, 43 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 83, 88 (2002) (recognizing the globalization of terrorist groups through increased communication, technology,
and networking, which in turn maximizes their effectiveness in organized crime); see generally Jennifer Giroux, David
/DQ] 'DPLDQR6JXDLWDPDWWL7KH7RUPHQWHG7ULDQJOH7KH5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQRI &RQÁLFWLQ6XGDQ&KDGDQGWKH&HQWUDO
African Republic (Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper No. 47, 2009), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Publications/wpPhase2/wp47.aspx (recognizing the need for a new
DSSURDFKLQFRPEDWLQJUHJLRQDOL]HGDUPHGFRQÁLFWLQ1RUWK&HQWUDO$IULFDGXHWRFURVVERUGHUDOOLDQFHVDQGPXOWLSOH
ethnic groups).
127 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 117, at 203-04.
128 See 2 id. (acknowledging that half and part sovereign states could in fact become belligerents when they possess
armed forces and enter war).
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cally, then, that “half and part” states could become co-belligerents in fact.
,I FREHOOLJHUHQF\ZHUHDSSOLFDEOHWRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWVWKHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
ZRXOGDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\EHSODFHGLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3GXHWRWKHRQJRLQJQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQDO4DHGDDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$4$3KDVPDGH
common cause with al-Qaeda—they have overlapping if not identical goals. There is evidence that
individuals who have fought with al-Qaeda have subsequently fought with the AQAP and there is
evidence that they share information, and expertise. These are indicators of the organizations providing each other what Oppenheim calls “help and succor,” similar in kind, if not degree, to a state
paying subsidies or sending a certain number of troops to a principal belligerent.129
B. Targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi
7KHH[LVWHQFHRI DQDUPHGFRQÁLFWWULJJHUVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZ³
WKHERG\RI ODZWKDWGHÀQHVWKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQÁLFW5HJDUGOHVVRI DSDUWLFXODUFRQÁLFW·VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRQHRI WZR´FDUGLQDOSULQFLSOHVµ130 of international humanitarian
law governing the laws and customs of law demands that states use weapons that distinguish between combatants and civilians.131 Combatants may be targeted at any time and in any place, so long
as they have not been rendered hors de combat “by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”132
Civilians, on the other hand, are protected from being directly targeted “unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.”133,QERWKLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWV
civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit their protected status under international humanitarian law while they directly participate in hostilities.
$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVQRSUHFLVHGHÀQLWLRQRI GLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQKRVWLOLWLHV134 it is generally accepted that direct participation in hostilities requires an act that is likely to result in a harm to the
adversary;135DVXIÀFLHQWFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHDFWDQGWKHKDUPDQGDQH[XVEHWZHHQWKH
DFWDQGRQJRLQJKRVWLOLWLHV7KHUHLVQRSUHFLVHDQGJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGGHÀQLWLRQRI DVXIÀFLHQWO\
129 See 2 id. at 206-07 (1935).
130 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
131 Id. Combatants include members of the armed forces of a state as well as “militia and volunteer corps who
IXOÀOOWKHIROORZLQJFRQGLWLRQV  7REHFRPPDQGHGE\DSHUVRQUHVSRQVLEOHIRUKLVVXERULGLQDWHV  7RKDYHDÀ[HG
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry arms openly; and (3) To conduct their operations in accord
with the laws and customs of war.” Convention between the United States and other Powers respecting the Laws and
Customs of War, Annex § 1, ch. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 6 U.T.S. 3516; see also, HCJ 769/02 Public Committee
Against Torture v. Israel [2005] (Isr.) at ¶ 24 [hereinafter Targeted Killing Case].
132 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
133 AP I at art. 51 (3); AP II at art. 13 (3); see also ICRC, Volume I, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 6
(2005).
134 Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-A, ¶ 173, 175 (Int’l Trib. For the Prosecution of Person Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terr. of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 July 17 2008) http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/acjug/en/ 080717.pdf.
135 See id. at ¶178. But see Schmitt, Deconstructing the Interpretive Guidance at 727 (arguing that acts that confer a
EHQHÀWRQRQHSDUW\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQKRVWLOLWLHV 
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close causal connection between an act and a harm to render the actor to be directly participating
in hostilities.136 Instead, acts are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, there is no precise or
JHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGGHÀQLWLRQIRUWKHWHPSRUDOFRPSRQHQWRI GLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQKRVWLOLWLHV137
Instead, there is wide agreement over the extreme cases and vigorous debate over the close ones.
7KXVIRUH[DPSOHWKHUHLVZLGHDJUHHPHQWWKDWDFLYLOLDQZKRSLFNVXSDZHDSRQDQGÀUHVLWDW
enemy armed forces is directly participating in hostilities. Additionally, there is agreement that the
LQGLYLGXDOZKRGLUHFWHGWKDWFLYLOLDQWRSLFNXSDQGÀUHWKDWZHDSRQLVGLUHFWO\SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQKRVtilities.138 But there is less agreement as to whether a civilian driving a truck loaded with munitions
for delivery to the front line is directly participating in hostilities. Likewise, there is wide agreement
that “a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his ‘home,’ and within in
the framework of his role in that organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods
of rest between them, loses his immunity from attack . . . .”139
Anwar al-Aulaqi was not a combatant. He was not a member of any state’s regular armed
IRUFHV1RULV$4$3DPLOLWLDRUYROXQWHHUFRUSVEHORQJLQJWRDSDUW\RI DFRQÁLFWWKDWLVVXEMHFWWR
UHVSRQVLEOHFRPPDQGZKRVHPHPEHUVZKHUHDÀ[HGGLVWLQFWLYHVLJQFDUU\WKHLUDUPVRSHQO\DQG
conduct their operations in accord with the laws and customs of war.140
There is likewise little doubt that Anwar al-Aulaqi was directly participating in hostilities—and,
therefore, a legitimate target. Although al-Aulaqi was perhaps best known for his accessible, colloquial English-language calls for jihad, the United States argues—and open-source reporting suggests—that al-Aulaqi was not a mere agent provocateur but also an operational leader of AQAP.141 The
GLVWLQFWLRQLVVLJQLÀFDQW$VDQRSHUDWLRQDOOHDGHUDO$XODTLZDVPRVWFHUWDLQO\GLUHFWO\SDUWLFLSDWLQJ
in hostilities:
[P]lanning at the operational level entails decisions about the conduct of particular
military campaigns or operations, whereas tactical planning encompasses individual
battles or engagements. All tactical level planning, such as mission planning for aerial
RSHUDWLRQVDPRXQWVWRGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQEHFDXVHVSHFLÀFPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVFRXOG
136 Targeted Killing Case at ¶ 34.
137 Id. at ¶ 39.
138 Id. at ¶ 37 (“In our opinion, the ‘direct’ character of the part taken should not be narrowed merely to the person
committing the physical act of attack. Those who have sent him, as well, take ‘a direct part’. The same goes for the
person who decided upon the act, and the person who planned it. It is not to be said about them that they are taking an
indirect part in the hostilities.”); see also Michael N. Schmitt, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS OR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 543 (2005).
139 Targeted Killing Case ¶ 39.
140 Cf. Targeted Killing Case ¶ 40 (stating that even if members of AQAP were subject to a responsible command,
FDUULHGDUPVRSHQO\DQGZRUHDÀ[HGGLVWLQFWLYHVLJQLWVRSHUDWLRQV³VRPHRI ZKLFKOLNHWKHSULQWHUFDUWULGJHERPEV
UHO\RQSHUÀG\RUVDERWDJHDQGGLUHFWO\WDUJHWFLYLOLDQV³FOHDUO\GRQRWDFFRUGZLWKWKHODZVRUFXVWRPVRI ZDU
141 See, e.g., Alex Kingsbury, Hunting Down Anwar al-Awlaki, Public Enemy No. 1, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov.
22, 2010, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/11/22/hunting-down-anwar-al-awlaki-public-enemy-no"3DJH1U  ´¶7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDW$ZODNLLVDVHQLRUÀJXUHLQ$4$3+HLVQRZLQWKHLUWRSOHDGHUVKLSUDQNVZLWKD
role that focuses on external operations plotting.’”).

Vol. 2, No. 1

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

77

not occur but for that planning.142
Moreover, as an operational leader, al-Aulaqi has made AQAP his “‘home’” and, in so doing, he has
made himself continuously targetable.143 Were he merely a propagandist, al-Aulaqi would not have
been a legitimate target no matter how vile his message.144
7KXVDO$XODTL·VKLJKSURÀOHUROHDVDXWKRUDQGSURGXFHURI $4$3·V(QJOLVKODQJXDJHInspire
magazine does not amount to direct participation in hostilities. However, al-Aulaqi’s role as a leader
of AQAP, responsible for that organization’s recent emphasis on attacking the United States and the
recruitment of attackers like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,145 does amount to direct participation in
hostilities. By directly participating in hostilities, al-Aulaqi lost the protection accorded civilians and
was subject to the use of force. Therefore, the United States’ targeting of al-Aulaqi was lawful to
WKHH[WHQWWKDWKHZDVWDUJHWHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI DQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFW
III. SELF-DEFENSE
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDOVRMXVWLÀHGLWVWDUJHWLQJRI DO$XODTL³DVZHOODVLWVWDUJHWHGNLOOLQJSURJUDP
generally—on the basis of self-defense.146 International law imbues states with an inherent right of
self-defense,147 which provides states with the right to use force as a response to a particular wrongful use of force by another state148 or a non-state actor.149 A state may rely on self-defense to justify
142 Schmitt, HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 138, at 543.
143 Targeted Killing Case ¶ 39 (Dec. 11, 2005). Cf. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 100709 (2008) (establishing that membership in an organized armed group, based on assumption of a continuous combat
function, renders an erstwhile civilian continuously targetable) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretative Guidance]; Michael N.
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J.
5, 16-25 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC’s “continuous combat function” criteria on numerous grounds but agreeing that
members of an organized armed group should be continuously targetable).
144 See Strugar, IT-01-42-A ¶ 177 (“Examples of indirect participation include . . . expressing sympathy for the cause
RI RQHRI WKHSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQÁLFWµ 7DUJHWHG.LOOLQJ&DVHSee also ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra note
143 at 1006 (“$VZLWK6WDWHSDUWLHVWRDUPHGFRQÁLFWVQRQ6WDWHSDUWLHVFRPSULVHERWKÀJKWLQJIRUFHVDQGVXSSRUWLYH
segments of the civilian population, such as political and humanitarian wings. The term organized armed group,
however, refers exclusively to the armed or military wing of a non-State party: its armed forces in a functional sense.”).
145 Abdulmuttalab: Cleric Told Me to Bomb Jet, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/02/04/national/main6174780.shtml.
146 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469
(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) available at:
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.; see also Harold Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against
Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011) http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operationagainst-osama-bin-laden/.
147 See, e.g.81&KDUWHUDUW7KRXJKFRGLÀHGLQDUWLFOHRI WKH81&KDUWHUWKHLQKHUHQWULJKWWRVHOIGHIHQVH
as a matter of customary international law, predates the Charter.
148 D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-13 (1958).
149 Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29
MICH. J. INT’L L. 127, 145 (2008).
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LWVXVHRI IRUFHHYHQZKHQLWLVQRWHQJDJHGLQDQDUPHGFRQÁLFW$QGWKRXJKLWLVDPDWWHURI 
some debate, a state may invoke self-defense in anticipation of an imminent armed attack.
The classical parameters of self-defense are famously described in an exchange of diplomatic
notes between the United States and United Kingdom in the Caroline incident.150 The Caroline incident elucidated the three limiting requirements of lawful self-defense: necessity, proportionality,
and immediacy.151 The victim state’s use of force must be necessary to disrupt the harmful attack it
faces. The victim state’s use of force must be proportional to the harm it faces. The victim state’s
use of force must either anticipate an imminent armed attack or immediately follow that attack.
These three factors combine to differentiate self-defense, a fundamentally responsive and preventative action, from armed reprisal, a responsive but fundamentally punitive action. Notably, all three
SDUDPHWHUVRI VHOIGHIHQVHDUHGHÀQHGLQUHODWLRQVKLSWRDSDUWLFXODURSSRVLQJDUPHGDWWDFN
Under customary international law, anticipatory self-defense—the resort to force to stymie an
impending attack—was presumed to be valid.152+RZHYHUWKH81&KDUWHU·VFRGLÀFDWLRQRI WKH
right to self-defense called into question the validity of anticipatory self-defense. Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter declares that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of . . .
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”153
The inclusion of the “armed attack” predicate for the invocation of self-defense in the U.N.
Charter has led some scholars to argue that self-defense is only valid after an armed attack.154 The
better view, though, is that Article 51 embraces the customary practice of self-defense in anticipation

150 Maj. Jason S. Wrachfordhe, The 2006 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Aggression, Self-Defense, or a Reprisal Gone Bad?, 60
A.F. L. Rev. 29, 53 (2007). The Caroline incident took place during the Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada. Citizens on
the US side of the Niagara River who sympathized with the Canadian rebels ferried supplies to the rebels using the
steamship Caroline. After the United Kingdom’s diplomatic protests failed to stop the provision of supplies to the rebels,
%ULWLVKVROGLHUVFURVVHGLQWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFDSWXUHGDQGVHWÀUHWRWKHCaroline, killing and wounding American
FLWL]HQVLQWKHSURFHVV7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVÀOHGDSURWHVWEXWWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPFODLPHGLWKDGDFWHGLQVHOIGHIHQVH
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVUHVSRQGHGIDPRXVO\WKDW%ULWDLQWRPDNHRXWLWVMXVWLÀFDWLRQPXVW
show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of
deliberation. It will be for [Britain] to show, also . . . supposing the necessity of the moment authorized
them to enter the territories of The United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
DFWMXVWLÀHGE\WKHQHFHVVLW\RI VHOIGHIHQFHPXVWEHOLPLWHGE\WKDWQHFHVVLW\
:HEVWHU·VUHEXWWDOPD\QRWKDYHUHÁHFWHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDWWKHWLPHLWZDVZULWWHQEXWLWVFOHDUDUWLFXODWLRQWKDWVHOI
GHIHQVHRQO\MXVWLÀHVWKHXVHRI IRUFHZKHQLWLVQHFHVVDU\LPPHGLDWHDQGSURSRUWLRQDOWRWKHWKUHDWQHFHVVLWDWLQJLWV
use, has become the standard employed by customary international law.
151 E.g., Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149 (“The three universally accepted criteria of self-defense appear in
the [Caroline incident exchange].”).
152 BOWETT, supra note 148, at 184.
153 U.N. Charter art. 51.
154 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275–78 (1963) (rebutting six key
arguments in favor of an interpretation allowing anticipatory self-defense). See also STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELFDEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–101 (1996) (discussing a jurist’s summary of arguments
for and against an interpretation permitting anticipatory self-defense).
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of an imminent armed attack.155 To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result of compelling
a state to suffer an armed attack of which the state had notice and the ability to disrupt—the very
essence of self-defense.156
Though the International Court of Justice has explicitly refused to consider the lawfulness
of anticipatory self-defense,157 state practice since the adoption of the U.N. Charter indicates that
self-defense in anticipation of an imminent armed attack is lawful.158 The anticipatory Israeli strike
DJDLQVWWKH(J\SWLDQDLUIRUFHLQ-XQHSURYLGHVWKHFODVVLFH[DPSOHRI MXVWLÀHGDQWLFLSDWRU\
self-defense. In that case, Egypt requested the U.N. force deployed in the Sinai as a buffer between
Egypt and Israel to withdraw. At the same time, Syrian troops accumulated on the Syria-Israel
155 See BOWETT, supra note 148 at 184–89 (declaring that a State’s right to anticipatory self-defense is well-established
under general international law and remains unchanged under Article 51 because the Charter did not explicitly alter
that right); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442–44 (Anthony Cassese, ed., 1986) (suggesting that reading Article
51 to preclude anticipatory self-defense creates an internal inconsistency between Article 2(4) and Article 51); see also
Antonio Cassese, Return of Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 505, 508–20 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) (asserting that the most likely interpretation
is that preemptive strikes are lawful against imminent threats because the Superpowers would not have been willing to
surrender that right).
156 See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV.
933, 942–44 (1987) (“Even if the Security Council functioned as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of
collective security, it would be unrealistic to expect a state faced with an imminent armed attack to wait for that attack to
be launched before resorting to force in self-defense.”).
157 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 222 (Dec. 19)
(“As was the case also in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
case, ‘reliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has already
occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised’
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194) . . . . ‘[A]ccordingly [the Court] expresses no view on that issue.’”) [hereinafter
Congo v. Uganda]. The Court determined that there had been no armed attack attributable to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Id. The Court did not consider the criteria of self-defense beyond the armed attack predicate. See id.
158 See, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 148, at 189 (noting that only India objected to Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir
despite no predicate armed attack); Higgins, supra note 153, at 443 (noting that the Security Council supported Israel’s
preemptive strike when Egypt mobilized troops and airplanes in 1967 but condemned Israel’s attack on an Iraqi nuclear
facility in 1981); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 192 (justifying Israel’s strike against Egypt in 1967 because “when
all of the measures taken by Egypt (especially the peremptory ejection of the United Nations Emergency Force from
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula; the closure of the Straits of Tiran; the unprecedented build-up of Egyptian
IRUFHVDORQJ,VUDHO·VERUGHUVDQGFRQVWDQWVDEUHUDWWOLQJVWDWHPHQWVDERXWWKHLPSHQGLQJÀJKWLQJ ZHUHDVVHVVHGLQWKH
aggregate, it seemed to be crystal-clear that Egypt was bent on an armed attack, and the sole question was not whether
war would materialize but when.”); Cassese, supra note 155, at 512 (mentioning asserted claims of anticipatory selfdefense by Israel, the U.S., the U.K., and the former USSR); Greenwood, supra note 156, at 943; High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Nov. 17, 2004) (“The language of [Article 51] is restrictive . . . [h]
owever, a threatened State . . . can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would
GHÁHFWLWDQGWKHDFWLRQLVSURSRUWLRQDWHµ 816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDOIn Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“Imminent threats are
fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed
attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.”).
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border. In light of these circumstances, the June 5, 1967, Israeli strike against the Egyptian air force
was viewed as a lawful use of anticipatory self-defense: the strike was necessary; the threat posed by
Egypt and Syria was immediate; and Israel’s initial strike—attacking the Egyptian air force to deprive
Egypt of air cover—was proportionate to the threat it faced.
In contrast, the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 was widely condemned
for failing to satisfy the criteria of self-defense.159 In that case, the threat to Israel was speculative
DQGUHPRWH7KH,UDTLQXFOHDUUHDFWRUZDVQRWÀQLVKHGDQGWKH,UDTLJRYHUQPHQWZDVQRWFORVHWR
constructing a weapon, let alone commencing an armed attack with that hypothetical weapon. Similarly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 failed to satisfy the criteria governing self-defense.160 Thus,
anticipatory self-defense is lawful in the face of an imminent armed attack but the mere threat of
force will not justify self-defense.161
The armed attack predicate of Article 51 has also given rise to a debate over what level of force
TXDOLÀHVDVDQDUPHGDWWDFN162 In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
 1RWDEO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVHHPHGWRDGRSW,VUDHO·VVHOIGHIHQVHMXVWLÀFDWLRQ³WKDWIDFLOLWLHVIRUGHYHORSLQJ
weapons of mass destruction change the imminence calculus for self-defense—in its 2002 National Security Strategy:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can
lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence
of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing
to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.
Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks
would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—
weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.
...
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVORQJPDLQWDLQHGWKHRSWLRQRI SUHHPSWLYHDFWLRQVWRFRXQWHUDVXIÀFLHQWWKUHDWWR
our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use
preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while
dangers gather.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002).
160 See Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 602–03 (2003)
(emphasizing the United States’ inability to articulate an imminent threat or make a strong enough case to win the
support of the Security Council for anticipatory action).
161 See DINSTEIN, supra note 158, at 182–83 (concluding that the Bush Doctrine—the asserted right to use force
against mere threats—is not lawful under Article 51).
162 See ALEXANDROV, supra note 154, at 115–16 (determining that, for purposes of Article 51, an armed attack should
EHHYDOXDWHGLQOLJKWRI WKHGHÀQLWLRQRI ´DJJUHVVLRQµLQ$UWLFOH J ZKLFKKDVEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGWRH[FOXGH´LVRODWHG
small-scale acts of armed force”).
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Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice impliedly adopted the notion that there is a threshold
between the mere use of force and that level of force rising to an armed attack. There, the Court
stated that it saw
no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply
to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an
operation, EHFDXVHRI LWVVFDOHDQGHIIHFWVZRXOGKDYHEHHQFODVVLÀHGDVDQDUPHGDWWDFNUDWKHUWKDQ
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.163
)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRI WKLVSDSHUWKRXJKLWLVVXIÀFLHQWWRQRWHWKDWWKHUHLVZLGHVSUHDGDJUHHPHQW
WKDWWKHERPELQJRI DVWDWH·VFLYLOLDQDLUFUDIWTXDOLÀHVDVDQDUPHGDWWDFNDJDLQVWWKDWVWDWH164 An
attack like that attempted on Christmas Day 2009 could have resulted in the destruction of at least a
civilian airliner and the deaths of nearly 200 civilians.165 As such, continued attacks by al-Aulaqi and
AQAP against U.S. aircraft constitute armed attacks against the United States.
+HUHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQYRNHVVHOIGHIHQVHDVDMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRULWVSODFLQJ$QZDUDO$XODTLRQ
a targeted kill list.166,WDOVRUHOLHVRQVHOIGHIHQVHDVDMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRULWVXVHRI WDUJHWHGNLOOLQJVJHQerally.167 The United States claims that “there are . . . legal bases under . . . international law for the
President to authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda and AQAP, including the inherent right to
self-defense.”168 This statement is uncontroversial, so far as it goes. Self-defense is an inherent right
of states under international law and self-defense does justify otherwise unlawful uses of force. The
8QLWHG6WDWHVPXVWKRZHYHUGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWLWVNLOOLQJRI $QZDUDO$XODTLVDWLVÀHVWKHUHTXLUHments of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. Those three requirements are addressed in turn.

163 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93 (June 27) (emphasis
added).
164 See, e.g., TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND
PRACTICE 204–12 (2010) (reasoning that civilian aircraft and merchant vessels are “‘external manifestations’ of the
State”); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J.
²   SURIIHULQJWKHLQFLGHQWVRI 6HSWHPEHUWKDVEHLQJÀUPO\ZLWKLQWKHERXQGVRI ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDQ
armed attack). But see Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
589, 596 (1989) (“To qualify as an armed attack, international law requires that terrorist acts form part of a consistent
pattern of violent terrorist action rather than just being isolated or sporadic attacks”). However, even if one were to
accept Cassese’s requirement that a series of attacks take place before they constitute an armed attack, at this point
AQAP attacks and attempted attacks against the United States likely rise to the level of Cassese’s interpretation of
“armed attack.”
165 Cf. Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note at 149 (interpreting Hezbollah’s cross-border rocket attacks against
civilians as armed attacks).
166 Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 9, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010).
167 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law and the Obama Administration, Keynote
Address Before the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
168 Mem. 4-5, 8-9, 24, Al-Aulaqi, No. 10-1469.
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A. Necessity
Under self-defense, necessity means that the “measures taken . . . must never be excessive or go beyond what is strictly required for the protection of the substantive rights which are
endangered.”169 Practically, this means that the state must be compelled to use force to disrupt an
ongoing or impending armed attack because no other effective means of redress are available.170 In
the NicaraguaFDVHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVMXVWLÀHGLWVDUPLQJRI DQWL1LFDUDJXDQUHEHOVDQGLWVPLQLQJ
of Nicaraguan waters in part as a self-defense response to Nicaragua’s arming of anti-Salvadorian
rebels. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found this invocation of self-defense unavailing
because the U.S. actions in question had taken place months after the anti-Salvadorian offensive
had been commenced and repulsed.171 Thus, armed force was unnecessary to repulse or prevent an
attack already defeated. Similarly, the international community rejected Israel’s invocation of selfdefense to justify its bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility. There, the absence of an actual or
LPPLQHQWDUPHGDWWDFNGHSULYHG,VUDHORI LWVVHOIGHIHQVHMXVWLÀFDWLRQ³IRUFHZDVQRWQHFHVVDU\WR
defeat a merely hypothetical armed attack.172
In contrast, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was at least initially necessary in the face of
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) freedom of action in Lebanon and attacks against Israel.
The Lebanese government’s inability or unwillingness to restrain PLO attacks on Israel is particularly
important when considering whether Israeli action was lawful self-defense.173 Notably, Israel targeted the PLO and not the Lebanese armed forces during its invasion.174
In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi and AQAP, it may well be that the use of force against al-Aulaqi
disrupted an impending armed attack. However, whether that use of force was necessary turns on
whether other non-forceful actions were available to disrupt that attack—including whether the
State of Yemen was willing and able to take action against al-Aulaqi and AQAP. In this regard, it
is to be noted that Yemen is actively pursuing AQAP175 and was also pursuing Anwar al-Aulaqi.176
169 BOWETT, supra note 148, at 269. See also Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149, at 151 (“[N]ecessity requires the
absence of adequate non-forceful options to deter or defeat the armed attack in question. . . . [N]ecessity requires that
¶EXWIRU·WKHXVHRI IRUFH>QRQIRUFHIXOPHDVXUHV@ZRXOGQRWVXIÀFHµ 
170 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA L. REV 933,
945 (1987) (“The question is whether [other means short of armed force] would have been as effective as an air strike in
preventing the imminent terrorist onslaught.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 158, at 209-210 (“Utopia must ascertain that there
exists a necessity to rely on force—in response to the armed attack—because no realistic alternative means of redress is
available. In other words, ‘force should not be considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or
when they clearly would be futile.’”); Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149, at 151.
171 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 122.
172 See Thomas Mallison, Aggression or Self-Defense in Lebanon in 1982?, 77 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 174, 177-80 (1983).
173 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 209-10 (2006).
174 Id. at 247-248. But see Mallison, supra note 172, at 177-80 (questioning Israel’s self-defense claim on the basis that
there was no actual or imminent armed attack).
175 Patrick Martin, Yemen on Offensive Against al-Qaeda Group, GLOBE AND MAIL (LONDON), Nov. 2, 2010; Mohammed
Jamjoom, 2IÀFLDO<HPHQ/DXQFKHV)LHUFH2IIHQVLYH$JDLQVWDO4DHGD, CNN, Sept. 21, 2010;
176 Mohammed Hatem, Yemen Militant Cleric Al-Awlaki’s Arrest Ordered by State Security Court, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 6,
2010.
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Moreover, the United States was cooperating with Yemen, providing it military, intelligence, and
logistical support, and even carrying out air strikes in coordination with Yemen.177
However, “necessity . . . does not require naivety.”178 As such, the examination of the necesVLW\RI 86XVHRI IRUFHDJDLQVWDO$XODTLDQG$4$3PXVWFRQVLGHUWKHHIÀFDF\RI <HPHQLHIIRUWV
against to counter AQAP and capture or kill al-Aulaqi.179 While Yemen is not a failed state, it is a
failing state.180 Its government is weak and currently confronting not only AQAP in southern Yemen but also a tribal rebellion in northern Yemen181 and a separate secessionist movement in the
south. Additionally, since January 2011, the Yemeni government, like many autocratic governments
in the region, has faced a broad-based and growing popular uprising that has inspired tribal factions
to defect from the Saleh regime, further weakening the state.182 These multifaceted challenges call
into question Yemen’s ability to effectively pursue AQAP and Anwar al-Aulaqi—in stark contrast to
its highly effective post-September 11 campaign against al-Qaeda proper.183
Importantly, the United States claims self-defense in relation to Anwar al-Aulaqi individually and
not simply AQAP. Invoking self-defense to justify the use of force against Anwar al-Aulaqi himself
required that he was personally responsible for an actual ongoing or imminent armed attack. Yet, if
neither threats nor even use of force short of an armed attack will justify self-defense, it seems that
mere calls for jihad similarly fails to satisfy the armed attack predicate of self-defense—regardless
of the accessibility or inspirational quality of those calls for jihad. That said, al-Aulaqi’s history of
planning actual attacks against the United States—like the Christmas Day bombing attempt or the
printer cartridge bombing attack—makes it likely that al-Aulaqi was continuing to plot attacks on
the United States at his death. If such a plot had advanced to the point of becoming an imminent
armed attack on September 30, 2011, then use of force against al-Aulaqi in self-defense was appro177 U.S. Airstrikes on Al Qaeda in Yemen, CBSNEWS.COM, (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_1625997532.html (stating the airstrikes carried out by the U.S. were conducted at the request of Yemen).; see also Wikileaks
Cable Corroborates Evidence of US Airstrikes in Yemen, AMNESTY INT’L, (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/newsand-updates/wikileaks-cable-corroborates-evidence-us-airstrikes-yemen-2010-12-01 (examining the various ways the U.S.
has collaborated with Yemen).
178 Schmitt, supra note 149, at 152.
179 Id. at 151-152.
180 The Failed States Index 2010, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_
failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (analyzing a range of factors to determine whether a state is a failed
state or is in danger of becoming a failed state) (last accessed Nov. 11, 2011).
181 See, e.g., Joost R. Hiltermann, Disorder on the Border, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
DUWLFOHVMRRVWUKLOWHUPDQQGLVRUGHURQWKHERUGHU H[DPLQLQJWKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ+RXWKLUHEHOVDQG<HPHQL
national army and the impact on an already weak Yemen).
182 Laura Kasinof, Yemeni Forces Heighten Deadly Assault on Protesters in City Central to Uprising, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2011).
183 See, e.g., Gregory D. Johnsen, AQAP in Yemen and the Christmas Day Terrorist Attack, CTC SENTINEL SPECIAL REPORT,
-DQDW ´'XULQJWKHÀUVWSKDVHRI WKHZDUDJDLQVWDO4D·LGDLQ<HPHQWKH86DQG<HPHQLJRYHUQPHQWV
cooperated quite closely, even working together to kill the then head of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi, in an
unmanned CIA drone strike in November 2002. Yemeni forces arrested his replacement, Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, a
year later. The successive losses of two key leaders as well as numerous other arrests effectively crippled the organization
in Yemen.”).
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priate—so long as the drone strike was both necessary and proportionate.
B. Proportionality
For use of force to be lawful under self-defense, that force must be proportionate. In the context of self-defense, proportionality demands that the force used be no more than required to deter
or disrupt an impending attack.184 Disproportionate use of force invalidates an otherwise lawful
invocation of self-defense.
In the case of self-defense against non-state actors, Dinstein provides a useful discussion of
proportionality:
[W]hen Utopia sends an expeditionary force into Arcadia, the operation is to be directed exclusively against the armed bands or terrorists, and it must not be confused with
defensive armed reprisals. Surely, no forcible action may be taken against the Arcadian
civilian population. Furthermore, even the Arcadian armed forces and installations
ought not to be harmed.185
It is clear from Dinstein’s discussion that a state’s use of force in self-defense against attacks
by a non-state actor must be directed at that non-state actor, leaving the host state free from harm,
for the use of force to be considered proportionate.186 Thus, in the Congo case the ICJ noted, “The
Court cannot fail to observe . . . that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometers
from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks [Uganda]
claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence . . . .”187 Similarly, in the Oil Platforms case, the
ICJ remarked that, had the Iranian anti-ship attack originated from the oil platforms attacked by the
United States, the United States’ use of force may have been proportionate.188 The United States’
destruction of an anti-ship missile position would have been a reasonable level of force to counter anti-ship attacks.189 However, the United States did not satisfy the proportionality requirement
of self-defense because it was not reasonably calibrated to deter or defeat an attack; it used force
against oil platforms from which no attack could be linked (or proven).190
It is clear that any force used against Anwar al-Aulaqi or AQAP under the rubric of self-defense must be tied to an imminent armed attack for which either al-Aulaqi or AQAP is responsible.
The level of force lawfully permitted is no more than that which is required to disrupt the impend184 Schmitt, supra note 149, at 153.
185 DINSTEIN, supra note 173, at 250.
186 See also Schmitt, supra note 149, at 155 (discussing Israel’s targeting of Lebanese infrastructure in relation to the
2006 Summer War against Hezbollah).
187 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 223 (Dec. 19).
188 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198 (Nov. 6) (holding that the attack on Iranian oil platforms by
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVQRWMXVWLÀHGE\VHOIGHIHQVHDQGHYHQLWKDGEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVDWLVÀHG
conditions required for an attack in self-defense, its attack on the oil platforms was not proportionate).
189 See id.
190 Id.
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ing attack. Additionally, it is clear that the force must be directed against al-Aulaqi or AQAP and not
the State of Yemen, its civilian population, its infrastructure, or its security services.
C. Immediacy
7KHÀQDOUHTXLUHPHQWRI ODZIXOXVHRI IRUFHXQGHUVHOIGHIHQVHLVWKDWRI LPPHGLDF\,PPHGLDF\
refers to the closeness in time of a wrongful act and the responsive use of force. When force is
used in self-defense in anticipation of an armed attack, immediacy requires that the wrongful act be
imminent.191 When self-defense occurs in response to an armed attack, there must not be an undue
lag in time between the wrongful act and the corresponding use of force.
$VLVWKHFDVHZLWKSURSRUWLRQDOLW\LWLVGLIÀFXOWWRGHWHUPLQHK\SRWKHWLFDOO\ZKHWKHUSURVSHFWLYH
86XVHRI IRUFHDJDLQVW$QZDUDO$XODTLVDWLVÀHVWKHLPPHGLDF\UHTXLUHPHQWRI VHOIGHIHQVH7KH
requirement, though, demands that there be a clear temporal relationship between a state’s use of
force and a particular ongoing or imminent armed attack. Like the other parameters of self-defense,
immediacy is a limiting principle.
It may well be that when the United States launched a drone strike targeting al-Aulaqi on September 30, 2011, it reasonably believed that al-Aulaqi was responsible for an imminent armed attack.
It is of no consequence that such an attack failed to materialize, but only that one was believed to be
imminent.
More troubling, however, is the apparent continuous targeting of al-Aulaqi due to his presence
on the CIA’s targeted kill list.192 On its face, such continuous targetability seems to violate selfdefense’s fundamental principle relating a particular use of force to a particular armed attack and
not merely the desire or hope of a state or armed group to launch an attack in the future. Some 208
days passed between al-Aulaqi’s addition to the CIA’s targeted kill list and the next publicly known
attempted AQAP attack on the United States. It is possible that AQAP and al-Aulaqi were on the
verge of an imminent armed attack against the United States each of those intervening 208 days. It
is also possible, however, that during some of those 208 days al-Aulaqi and AQAP lay dormant, that
WKH\WKHQSODQQHGWKHDWWDFNUHFUXLWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHDWWDFNSUHSDUHGWKHDWWDFNDQGWKHQÀQDOO\
carried out the attempted attack. During at least some of this period, neither al-Aulaqi nor AQAP
would have been lawful targets under self-defense because the attack would not have been imminent.193
One answer to the apparent immediacy problem may be that al-Aulaqi and AQAP were avowed
threats to the United States—even if they only carried out attacks sporadically. They have targeted
191 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933,
945 (1987) (“It would not be enough, therefore, that the United States anticipated further attacks by Libya at some
XQVSHFLÀHGIXWXUHGDWH7RUHPDLQZLWKLQWKHOLPLWVRI VHOIGHIHQFHDVWKH\KDYHEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKH6HFXULW\
Council, the air strike against Libya must have been a response to a threat of terrorist attacks against the United States
which could reasonably have been described as imminent by [the date of the U.S. air strike on Libya].”).
192 See Mazzetti, supra note 1.
193 Compare, for instance, the Israeli airstrike on Egypt in 1967 with the Israeli airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear
reactor in 1981. See U.N. S.C. Meeting Notes of Security Council, ¶¶ 55, 59, U.N. Doc. S/2280 (June 12, 1981), available
at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/100/21/pdf/NL810021.pdf ?OpenElement
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the United States previously, they inspire others to target the United States, and al-Aulaqi provided
UHOLJLRXVMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKHNLOOLQJRI $PHULFDQV0RUHRYHU$4$3·VRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFDSDFLW\DQG
access to resources may give it the ability to launch attacks on targets of opportunity. For those reasons, AQAP and al-Aulaqi continuously presented immediate threats to the United States, justifying
their targeting under self-defense.
Yet, consider Israel’s airstrike on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and the Israeli strike
against the Egyptian air force in 1967. In 1981, Iraq was an avowed enemy of Israel.194 Iraq had
repeatedly threatened Israel.195 Iraqi army units had even fought against Israel in 1948, 1967, and
1973. Despite Iraq’s threatening posture towards Israel, the international community rejected Israel’s
invocation of self-defense to justify its airstrike,196 subjecting Israel to a unanimous Security Resolution condemning its action.197 Israel’s 1981 invocation of anticipatory self-defense failed because
Iraq was a mere threat—even assuming it possessed the will and desire to use a nuclear weapon
against Israel, it lacked the means to do so. It could not be argued that Iraq was on the verge of
launching an armed attack against Israel—at least not with a nuclear weapon manufactured at the
then-incomplete Osirak nuclear facility.
In contrast, Israel’s strike against the Egyptian air force in 1967 is a paradigmatic example of
anticipatory self-defense. In that case—as in the case of Iraq in 1981—Egypt was an avowed threat
to Israel. Egypt had repeatedly threatened Israel and Egypt and Israel had already fought two wars.
However, unlike with Iraq in 1981, in 1967 Israel reasonably believed that Egypt was on the verge
of launching an armed attack against it. The difference in proximity of the anticipated attack is the
FULWLFDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ,VUDHO·VMXVWLÀHGLQYRFDWLRQRI VHOIGHIHQVHLQDQGLWVIDLOHGLQYRFDtion of self-defense in 1981.198 This difference in outcomes between 1967 and 1981 suggests that
even a dedicated, continuous threat will not justify self-defense in the absence of an imminent or
194 See id. (Indeed, following Israel’s attack on Osirak, Yehuda Blum, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United
Nations described Iraq as “one of Israel’s most implacable enemies.”).
195 See, e.g., 1LFN%:LOOLDPV-U 'DQLHO:LOOLDPVIraq Threatens Israel With Use of Nerve Gas: Mideast: Leader denies
nuclear capability but says he would destroy ‘half ’ his adversary if attacked, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 3, 1990) http://articles.
latimes.com/1990-04-03/news/mn-702_1_gas-attack. In fact, Israel also claimed to be in a continuous state of war with
Iraq.
196 Cf. :7KRPDV0DOOLVRQ 6DOO\90DOOLVRQThe Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor:
Aggression or Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 417, 429-31 (1982) (noting that expert testimony and French and
8QLWHG6WDWHVRIÀFLDOVGRQRWVXSSRUW,VUDHO·VUHVSRQVHWR,UDT·VQXFOHDUWKUHDWEHFDXVHRI HYLGHQFHWKDW,VUDHO·VFODLPV
regarding Iraq’s technological progress and nuclear posture were “erroneous or misleading”).
197 See S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 3, U.N.Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981) (“Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”).
198 See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in ANTONIO CASSESE,
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442-443 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986); Antonio
Cassese, Return of Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the Charter System, in ANTONIO CASSESE, THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 505, 515 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986); Stanimir Alexandrov, SELFDEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159-161 (Kluwer Law International 1996); W. Thomas
0DOOLVRQ 6DOO\90DOOLVRQThe Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense,
15 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 417, 429-431 (1982); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 186
(Cambridge University Press 2006).
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ongoing armed attack.
Thus, while al-Aulaqi and AQAP may continuously threaten the United States, their continuous
desire to harm the United States alone does not satisfy the immediacy requirement of self-defense—
and does not justify their continuous targeting as self-defense. Instead, al-Aulaqi (or AQAP) could
only be attacked by the United States on the basis of self-defense when he (or it) was responsible
for an ongoing or imminent armed attack against the United States. Notably, though this analysis
suggests that self-defense is an inappropriate basis for any targeted killing program in which a listed
individual is continuously subject to use of force, the actual use of force on a particular day may still
be lawful. That is, it may be that the drone strike on September 30, 2011, against al-Aulaqi was lawful self-defense, but that a similar hypothetical strike on September 1, 2011, or March 1, 2011, would
not have been.
CONCLUSION
That al-Aulaqi was a threat to the United States is beyond argument. He recruited and encouraged individuals to take part in jihad against the United States. He was directly involved in the planning of operations directed against the United States. However, the utility of killing al-Aulaqi is not
LWVHOI VXIÀFLHQWWRVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWRI VHOIGHIHQVH6HOIGHIHQVHUHTXLUHVWKDWDO$XODTLZDV
more than a mere threat—he must have been responsible for an ongoing or imminent armed attack
against the United States. And use of force as self-defense must have been responsive to that armed
DWWDFN7KXVLWLVWKHQDWXUHRI VHOIGHIHQVHWKDWXQGHUPLQHVLWVXVHDVDMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUDEURDG
targeted killing program in which targets, once selected, are continuously subject to the use of force.
Instead, in the case of al-Aulaqi at least, the United States is better served by relying on international humanitarian law and al-Aulaqi’s conduct as an operational leader of AQAP to justify his
killing. As such a leader, al-Aulaqi has forfeited his protected status by directly participating in hosWLOLWLHVLQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ<HPHQDQG$4$37KH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVLQWHUYHQLQJLQWKDWDUPHGFRQÁLFWSODFLQJLWVLPLODUO\LQDQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWZLWK$4$3
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVWKXVMXVWLÀHGLQLWVXVHRI IRUFHDJDLQVWDO$XODTLVRORQJDVKHGLUHFWO\SDUWLFLpated in hostilities—something he appeared to have been doing continuously until his death.

